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ARTICLES
TWO ROADS DIVERGED: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION BY THE CIRCUIT COURTS
AND SUPREME COURT IN THE SAME CASES
Lawrence Baum* & James J. Brudney**
Scholars and judges have long disagreed on whether courts of appeals
construing statutes ought to adapt their use of interpretive resources to
Supreme Court approaches. If circuit courts and the Supreme Court
approach statutory issues in similar ways, this can perhaps provide a
measure of predictability for litigants and the public while conserving
judicial resources; it may also enhance perceptions of fairness in the judicial
system.
Such normative arguments invite—even demand—a fuller
understanding of the underlying descriptive reality: whether anything
approaching uniformity or consistency actually exists.
This Article aims to provide that understanding. It does so through an indepth examination of similarities and differences in how the Supreme Court
and circuit courts apply key interpretive resources in a universe of identical
cases involving statutory interpretation: those in which the Supreme Court
reviews what an appeals court has decided. From circuit judges’ standpoint,
such cases are more complex than the bulk of their docket; moreover, the
judges are nearly always aware when they are creating or contributing to
circuit conflicts that are centrally important to the Supreme Court’s granting
of certiorari.
Our findings provide a modicum of support for the virtue of predictability.
The Supreme Court’s increasing reliance during the Rehnquist and Roberts
years on ordinary meaning, language canons, and dictionaries, and its
declining interest in legislative history, are trends that the appeals courts
followed with a lag of several years, suggesting that circuit courts are
influenced to some degree by Supreme Court changes in emphasis and
priority.
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But a number of findings lend descriptive support to normative arguments
opposing uniformity. Some results support divergent approaches based on
differences in institutional perspective: circuit courts prefer simpler
interpretive frameworks as more compatible with their heavier workloads.
Other findings supporting a pluralist approach in these identical cases
suggest that appeals courts are reacting silently but negatively to the
doctrinaire pronouncements of certain Supreme Court justices. And a third
set of findings underscores both the necessity and the value of deliberative
disputation between the two judicial levels.
In the end, it is the divergence in interpretive approaches between the two
levels of courts that stands out. Based on our empirical and doctrinal
analyses, a substantial degree of divergence seems inevitable even in this
special universe of identical cases. Whatever its desirability may be as a
normative matter, uniformity between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals in reliance on interpretive resources is a chimera.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars and judges have opined for years on whether courts of appeals
construing statutes ought to adapt their use of interpretive resources to U.S.
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Supreme Court approaches.1 To the extent these arguments rest primarily on
the Supreme Court’s role in exercising hierarchical control over lower
courts—a kind of methodological stare decisis—they have little traction. As
we and other scholars have observed, the Court has been both divided and
less than consistent about the relative weight given to text, canons,
dictionaries, and legislative history.2
Still, arguments for a more consistent approach to interpretive resource
usage between these two judicial levels may be based on the value of
uniformity for its own sake. If circuit courts and the Supreme Court approach
statutory issues in similar ways, this can perhaps provide a measure of
predictability for litigants and the public while conserving judicial resources;
it may also enhance perceptions of fairness in the judicial system. Such
normative arguments invite—even demand—a fuller understanding of the
underlying descriptive reality: whether anything approaching uniformity or
consistency actually exists. This Article aims to provide that understanding
through an in-depth examination of similarities and differences in how the
Supreme Court and circuit courts apply key interpretive resources.
Comparing interpretive practices between these two judicial levels as a
whole, however, is akin to comparing apples and oranges. Supreme Court
justices today decide fewer than seventy-five cases per year, each raising
1. Compare Nicholas Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085 (2002), and Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J.
1750 (2010), with Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis,
102 GEO. L.J. 1573 (2014), and Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How
Lower Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 492–93 (2015), and Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of
Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. FORUM 47 (2010); see also Digital Realty
Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782–83 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing her
colleagues’ methodological refusal to rely on legislative history as a confirmatory resource
when the text is clear); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 229 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (warning about the stare decisis nature of the majority’s assertedly novel
application of two language canons).
2. On text, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (2006). See also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287
(2010); Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015). On canons, see
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Canons of Construction] and Edward L.
Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to
Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579 (1992). On dictionaries, see James J. Brudney &
Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the
Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV 483 (2013) [hereinafter Oasis or
Mirage] and Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998). On legislative history, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect,
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) [hereinafter Liberal Justices] and Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417
(2003). See generally James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation
in the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV, 681, 691 (2017) [hereinafter Protean
Statutory Interpretation]; Adrian J. Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001).
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deeply contested legal questions.3 They typically respond to resource-driven
arguments from highly experienced lawyers, augmented by a wealth of
amicus briefs including briefs from the solicitor general when the United
States is not a party. By contrast, circuit courts decide thousands of cases
each year, creating pressure to reach decisions with little attention to
methodological approaches.4 Further, many if not most cases involve factspecific disputes that present no novel legal questions; there also are far fewer
amicus briefs and the quality of lawyer participation is considerably more
uneven than in the Supreme Court.5
But what if the comparison between the Supreme Court and circuit court
approaches is apples to apples? This would involve examining how the two
judicial levels rely on interpretive resources for a universe of identical
cases—those on which the Supreme Court reviews what an appeals court has
decided. From circuit judges’ standpoints, such cases are more complex and
important than the bulk of their dockets. Further, the judges are likely to
understand that their decisions have a more than remote chance of being
taken up by the justices. One major reason is that conflicts between circuits
are centrally important to the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari in
statutory cases, and judges nearly always are aware when they are creating
or contributing to circuit conflicts.6

3. In the 2011–2017 Terms, the Court decided an average of seventy-three cases with
full opinions per term. This figure was calculated from the numbers of full opinions shown in
table I(C) of the “Statistics” articles in the November issues of volumes 126 to 132 of the
Harvard Law Review. In the Burger Court era, the Court decided about 150 cases per term.
On the decline after the Burger Court, see David M. O’Brien, A Diminished Plenary Docket,
89 JUDICATURE 134 (2005) and David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary
Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151 (2010).
4. In 2017, the courts of appeals terminated 54,347 cases through decisions on the merits,
with the largest number in the Ninth Circuit (11,867) and the smallest number in the District
of Columbia Circuit (1050). Table B-5, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/jb_b5_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/87R2-79XX] (last visited Nov. 12,
2019); see also Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 695 (reporting that for three
federal circuits, each appeals court judge participated in 253–430 merits decisions from 2005
to 2015, four-to-seven times as many as each of the justices).
5. See Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 696; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal
Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 12–17 (2018).
6. One study of the 2003–2005 Terms, which included both statutory and nonstatutory
cases, found lower court conflict in 69 percent of the cases that the Court decided after granting
certiorari. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 981–82 (2007). In all likelihood, the percentage for
statutory cases was even higher. Based on data in the Supreme Court Database (archived at
Washington University School of Law), in the 2012–2016 Terms, the Court cited circuit
conflict in its opinion as a reason for hearing the case in 40 percent of the statutory cases with
oral argument in which it reviewed a court of appeals decision. That proportion understates
the importance of circuit conflict as a basis for accepting cases. This is primarily because the
Court often cites no reason for hearing a case, including cases in which the petitioner made a
credible claim of a conflict. Of the statutory cases in which the Court did cite a reason in the
2012–2016 Terms, it referred to circuit conflict in 62 percent. See generally SUP. CT.
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php [https://perma.cc/7NDQ-SCGL] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019).
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Our Article is devoted to exploring these identical cases. We examine the
interpretive approaches taken over a fifty-year period in hundreds of
instances where the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then reviewed
appeals court decisions. Our dataset consists of 321 Supreme Court decisions
and their appeals court counterparts, applying federal statutory law in one
area—labor and employment—and covering the period from 1969 to 2018.7
Based on our analysis of one hundred or more cases decided by the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, along with the appeals court decisions
reviewed in each instance, we develop a nuanced and in-depth picture of
similarities and differences in the way these two judicial levels have
addressed their interpretive task for the same cases over extended time
periods.
One should expect greater uniformity in interpretive reliance between the
two levels for circuit court cases heard by the Supreme Court as distinct from
all circuit court decisions.8 But just how much uniformity is there: do these
paired cases reflect identity more than divergence? Relatedly, how exactly
should we assess the degree or nature of this uniformity? Based on overall
instances of interpretive reliance at both judicial levels for an extended
number of years? By comparing reliance trends over time between the two
judicial levels? By focusing on the individual cases in which both the
Supreme Court and appeals court rely on the same resource?
In seeking answers to these questions, we compare the nature and extent
of reliance in our universe of identical cases for six separate interpretive
resources. Three resources—ordinary meaning, dictionaries, and language
canons—are generated by courts and are associated with a more textualist
orientation. The other three—legislative history, legislative purpose, and
agency deference—are generated by the politically accountable branches and
are linked to a more purposivist focus. These six resources have acquired
special saliency, as the Supreme Court since the late 1980s has become more
self-consciously methodological in its approach to interpreting statutes.
We summarize our findings here, based on an empirical analysis that is
organized in three distinct segments. Starting with the dataset as a whole, we
looked for general patterns in the application of resources. Over the entire
fifty-year period, circuit courts relied on ordinary meaning and agency
deference more often than the Supreme Court. Conversely, the Supreme
Court relied on dictionaries and purpose more often than the courts of
appeals. And the two judicial levels relied to virtually the same extent on
language canons and legislative history.9 Appeals courts’ tendency to rely
more often on ordinary meaning than the Supreme Court was especially
strong in cases under labor-management relations statutes. Further, in

7. More precisely, the cases that we analyzed were decided in the 1969–2017 Terms of
the Court.
8. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap
Between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 104, 104–05,
119 (2015); Bruhl, supra note 5, at 46–47.
9. See Table 1 infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
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contrast with other statutes, the circuit courts relied somewhat more often on
language canons and legislative history than the Supreme Court in Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 197410 (ERISA) cases.11 As expected,
reliance on textualist resources is associated with more pro-employer results
and reliance on purposivist resources with more pro-employee results.
However, those associations are relatively weak with two exceptions: courts
of appeals are substantially more likely to invoke legislative history and
agency deference in pro-employee decisions.12
Second, we examined temporal patterns of reliance. We explored three
distinct Court eras13 to determine whether broad trends in judicial reliance
for our six identified resources follow similar paths in the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals. We found sharp decreases for legislative purpose at both
court levels that were essentially simultaneous, which indicated that both
levels were likely affected by similar “outside” factors. In contrast,
substantial increases or decreases for ordinary meaning, language canons,
and legislative history occurred earlier in the Supreme Court, which indicates
that circuit courts may have been influenced by the Court’s greater
enthusiasm for ordinary meaning and language canons and its diminished
appetite for legislative history.14
Third, we analyzed case-specific patterns of reliance for our six targeted
resources. We focused on “co-reliance,” in which both the circuit court and
Supreme Court rely on a given resource in the same case. We found that this
co-reliance is highest for legislative history, followed by language canons,
ordinary meaning, and agency deference; legislative purpose and dictionaries
rank lowest.15 Moreover, the two levels of courts increasingly diverged in
their choices of resources in the same cases between the Burger and Roberts
Courts, with most of that increase occurring in the Rehnquist era.16 This
increasing divergence is consistent with the possibility that the doctrinaire
approaches to choices of resources by certain Supreme Court justices have
produced higher levels of divergence between courts in the resources they
apply to the same case.
Probing further into co-reliance with respect to three of our resources
(legislative history, language canons, and dictionaries), we found that it was
quite common for the two judicial levels to invoke the same resource in
different forms, in terms of the particular type of legislative history, the
specific language canon, or the particular dictionary definition deemed
10. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
11. See Table 2 infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
12. See Table 3 infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
13. These eras are the Burger Court from 1969 to 1986; the Rehnquist Court from 1986
to 2005; and the Roberts Court from 2005 to 2018. See Table 4 infra Part II.B and
accompanying text.
14. See Table 5 infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
15. See Table 6 infra Part II.C and accompanying text. Co-reliance overall is higher for
affirmances than for reversals; the statistical relationship is meaningful though not dramatic.
See Table 7 infra Part II.C and accompanying text.
16. See Table 8 infra Part II.C and accompanying text.
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relevant to help decide the issues in a given case. This finding underscores
the divergence between the two courts in the ways they applied the same
resources to individual cases. Finally, we analyzed from a doctrinal
standpoint a limited number of individual paired cases involving reliance on
dictionaries, language canons, and legislative history. We identify cases
where the specific version of the resource relied upon was consistent between
the two judicial levels and cases where the specific version was inconsistent
between the Supreme Court and the circuit court. Inconsistent cases tend to
reflect strategic application of a resource by the Supreme Court.
Based on our findings involving case-specific patterns of reliance, it
appears that divergences in reliance on particular resources—both between
resource categories and within the same category17—have increased or
become more salient in the Roberts years. The justices seem at times willing
to depart from or abandon circuit court methodological positions as part of
their substantive judicial review. And circuit court judges may be silently
resisting the inflexible application of interpretive resources by certain
justices.
More broadly, our findings in support of a modest role for uniformity in
fostering predictable usages between judicial levels are considerably
outweighed by evidence that uniformity is subordinated to other interests:
institutional needs at the appeals court level; circuit court reluctance to bow
to orthodox textualist methodologies; and the inevitability and value of
methodological contestation between the two judicial levels.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses debates over
the value of a uniform approach when interpreting statutes in both the
Supreme Court and circuit courts. Part II, the centerpiece of the Article,
presents our empirical results. Part III examines a limited number of coreliance cases in doctrinal terms, in an effort to illuminate further certain
aspects of our empirical results. Part IV relates our empirical and doctrinal
findings back to the normative debate over uniformity.
I. THE DEBATE OVER UNIFORMITY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Statutory interpretation at different judicial levels is characterized by
conflicting and hotly contested theoretical approaches. Supreme Court
justices and circuit court judges, as well as scholars of the federal and state
judiciary, disagree on the weight—or in some instances even admissibility—
that should be attached to a range of interpretive resources, including the
ordinary meaning of enacted text, dictionary definitions, language and
substantive canons, legislative history and purpose, agency deference, and
17. Divergences between resource categories refer to situations where, for instance, one
court relies on language canons or legislative history and the other does not. Divergences
within resource categories occur when both courts rely on language canons or legislative
history but they invoke wholly separate specific versions, as when the appeals court relies on
a conference committee report while the Supreme Court relies on House floor statements, or
the appeals court relies on in pari materia while the Supreme Court relies on the rule against
surplusage.
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legislative inaction.18 Amidst the high decibel level of judicial and academic
noise, arguments have emerged favoring adoption of a more uniform
approach to construing enacted laws that would apply to all courts. The
source for such uniform rules is not our concern here: they could emerge
from Congress or state legislatures, from the highest court in a given
jurisdiction, or from designated advisory bodies such as those that developed
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Evidence.19 Rather, we are interested
in the arguments for and against uniformity as a value in statutory
interpretation, especially between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals.
A. Arguments Favoring a Uniform Approach Between Court Levels
Those favoring a uniform approach that would apply to both higher and
lower federal courts focus on several benefits. Probably the most prominent
is predictability in rule-of-law terms. A single controlling regime of statutory
interpretation would mean that citizens who litigate under federal laws can
rely on the same set of interpretive rules (or perhaps tiered hierarchies of
rules) when arguing their cases before a district court, a circuit court, or the
Supreme Court.20 The Supreme Court could reinforce the applicability of
such an interpretive regime for lower federal courts by utilizing its powers of
judicial review.21 It has been suggested that federal circuit courts might
welcome this kind of direction or guidance, given their enormous caseloads
and the fact that “most of the appeals they get can be decided
uncontroversially by the application of settled principles.”22 But even if
circuit court judges would not embrace a uniform interpretive regime,23 the
litigants and attorneys who argue cases before them might do so, in order to
understand and make best use of the hierarchy of interpretive sources that
courts at all levels will find persuasive.24 In addition, Congress would be in
a position to understand more clearly how its legal texts and lawmaking

18. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J.
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 643–890, 1073–1178
(5th ed. 2014) (hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL.); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 1–329, 737–874 (2d ed. 2013).
19. See Rosenkranz, supra note 1 (arguing for a legislative authorization); Sydney Foster,
Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1863 (2008) (arguing for a judicial authorization). We also do not address the
constitutional issues surrounding whether Congress or state legislatures can dictate
interpretive rules to the judicial branch.
20. See Foster, supra note 19, at 1892; Gluck, supra note 1, at 1770, 1851.
21. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1852; Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 580–
81 (2002).
22. Gluck, supra note 1, at 1852 n.357 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 367 (1999)).
23. Judge Richard Posner himself did not always favor such consistency in construing
statutes, advocating instead for a pragmatic approach. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 191–203, 242–45 (2008).
24. See Leib & Serota, supra note 1, at 48.
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processes will be regularly construed, allowing it to draft future laws with
such knowledge in mind.25
The benefits flowing from predictability also mean that the absence of a
uniform methodological approach involves costs associated with uncertainty.
Federal courts of appeals must address the weight and priority of various
interpretive resources using their own best judgment, which inevitably takes
them in different directions. Further, undue discretion in interpretive
approaches leads to methodological conflicts between the circuits and the
Supreme Court that implicate matters of substantive law: a claim under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 193826 (FLSA) or ERISA may be resolved
differently based on the weight given to text, language canons, or legislative
history.27 This in turn may incentivize strategic behavior by individual
judges or justices, denying litigants adequate clarity regarding the types of
statutory arguments to make that will be accepted or effective in front of
courts or agencies.
In addition, uniform interpretive rules between judicial levels would
presumably result in cost savings for both courts and lawyers.28 Thus,
assuming adoption of a rule excluding legislative history from the
interpretive process, or identifying Webster’s Third New International
Unabridged Dictionary as the sole source of word definitions, the justices
and their appellate court colleagues would no longer expend time and
resources researching legislative record evidence or sifting through
definitions from multiple dictionaries.
Finally, there is the potential for what Abbe Gluck refers to as aspirational
benefits. Gluck contends that this level of coordination among judges from
different courts, in which they regularly set forth the same governing
interpretive rules, may “serve as a reminder to the judges of the rules
themselves. Perhaps ideology is less salient and the rules themselves do more
work . . . because of this constant reminder. In this fashion the act of
expressing the consistent rules may have a performative function.”29

25. See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 2142.
26. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
27. See, e.g., Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006) (relying
inter alia on plain language and legislative history to hold in favor of an FLSA plaintiff), rev’d,
551 U.S. 158 (2007) (relying inter alia on language canons and agency deference while
eschewing reliance on plain meaning and legislative history); Geissel v. Moore Med. Corp.,
114 F.3d 1458 (8th Cir. 1997) (relying inter alia on text, language canons, purpose, and
legislative history to hold against an employee seeking continuation health insurance coverage
under an amendment to ERISA), vacated, 524 U.S. 74 (1998) (relying exclusively on text
while eschewing reliance on language canons, legislative history, or purpose).
28. See Foster, supra note 19, at 1893–95; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 132–34 (2006). Such cost savings may be attributable to the content of specific
uniform methods (as with reliance on one particular dictionary or an accepted exclusion of
legislative history sources, both mentioned in text), but they also may result from a general
commitment to pursue uniformity per se.
29. Gluck, supra note 1, at 1855.
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B. Arguments Opposing a Uniform Approach Between Court Levels
Opponents of uniformity offer a number of arguments against a rule-based
approach. First, as a descriptive matter, there is nothing close to consensus
regarding the correct way to engage in statutory interpretation. Although all
judges would presumably agree that the text is of primary importance,30 “[n]o
court, and not even any single judge, is completely consistent in interpretive
approach from case to case.”31 This latter statement applies to Supreme
Court justices, including even Justice Scalia: his notable opposition to the
use of legislative history did not stop him from joining some majority
opinions that relied on it,32 from writing dissents asserting its probative
value,33 or from authoring majorities that invoked certain forms of it.34 And
on the current Court, the textualist position taken by Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch is at odds with the purposivist approach generally followed by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Given that there is little
methodological uniformity on the Supreme Court, one should not expect
such uniformity between the Supreme Court and appeals court judges, who
have limited ability to ascertain what the Supreme Court wants them to do
when they choose interpretive resources and limited incentives to follow the
Supreme Court’s shifting lead.
The lack of methodological consensus on the current Supreme Court also
reflects how judicial positions on statutory interpretation have evolved over
time. Initially and through most of the nineteenth century, U.S. courts
proclaimed their fidelity to legislative “intent,” yet they most often followed
an eclectic approach rather than one based on larger theories.35 From the
1930s until the mid-1980s, federal courts generally adhered to a legal process
methodology that included considerable attention to legislative history.36
Since the late 1980s, federal courts have tended to embrace a more textualist
methodology that emphasizes the role of ordinary meaning and the language
canons and downgrades legislative history and purpose,37 although there has
recently been some pushback against an overly textualist approach.38 This
pattern of continuing adjustment, and the ongoing tension evidenced in
30. In a widely quoted statement at a 2015 talk at Harvard Law School, Justice Elena
Kagan said that “we’re all textualists now.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016).
31. Bruhl, supra note 5, at 10–11.
32. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (joining
Justice O’Connor’s majority).
33. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
727–29 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 875–76, 877–78 (2014) (Scalia,
J.) (relying on statutory history and context accompanying changes in textual language).
35. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 478–80 (citing numerous sources).
36. See id. at 506–07, 514–15. See generally Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and
Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative
History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013).
37. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 568–83. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
38. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014); Re, supra note 2; Molot, supra
note 2. See generally Vermeule, supra note 2.
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current disagreements among both justices and appeals court judges,39
counsels against freezing in place any single approach that would control
methodological relations between the Supreme Court and the circuits.
Apart from these practical realities, certain normative considerations
militate against a uniform approach. As other scholars have observed,
interpretive methodology involving statutes is more akin to “a web of
considerations with different and varying weights rather than a set of
hierarchical rules.”40 Canons now number in the hundreds;41 whether the
whole act rule should trump in pari materia or the rule disfavoring repeals by
implication should prevail over the rule that later-enacted laws control over
earlier ones will inevitably call for situational analysis rather than a rule-like
application, something even ardent textualists readily acknowledge.42
Similarly, a uniformly chosen dictionary will have multiple definitions for
most, if not all, statutory terms contested in litigation.43 In this context,
notions of compliance or noncompliance become fuzzy at best.44
Assuming arguendo that compliance could be measured and implemented
in a more rigorous fashion, the consequences of a uniform interpretive
approach between courts might be less than welcome. Because such rules
about interpretation would operate prospectively, they would shape and limit
rights, responsibilities, and liabilities under substantive law.45 Thus, for
instance, a uniform determination by the Supreme Court to confer upon the
whole act rule and its corollaries priority status among all canons, or to rely
exclusively on the Oxford English Dictionary for word definitions, or to
exclude all consideration of legislative history, would apply to every appeals
court interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196446 (“Title
VII”), ERISA, or federal criminal law. This result seems ironic, if not
paradoxical, given that substantive law is more directly and heavily relied
upon than interpretive approaches—by parties to litigation but also by
39. Compare KATZMANN, supra note 38, with Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994).
40. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 1, at 1593 (quoting Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1811 (2010)).
41. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 56–339 (2012) (cataloging
canons as inter alia semantic, syntactic, contextual, expected meaning, governmentstructuring, private-right, and stabilizing); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 1195–1215
(listing more than 150 canons invoked by Supreme Court from 1986 to 2014).
42. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 41, at 59 (“Principle of Interrelating Canons: No
canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the strength of differing
principles that point in other directions.”).
43. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
Justices Thomas and Breyer differed on the appropriate definition for making material
misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The Oxford English
Dictionary, on which Justice Thomas relied, listed more than seventy different definitional
senses of the verb “to make.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, on which Justice
Breyer relied, listed more than forty such senses. For further discussion, see Oasis or Mirage,
supra note 2, at 555–57.
44. See Bruhl, supra note 5, at 11.
45. See Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 1, at 1592.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
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agencies seeking to administer the substantive law and by the public at
large.47
It is apparent that methodology is distinctly subordinate to substantive law
in relations between levels of courts when one considers the basis for
certiorari petitions. As Aaron-Andrew Bruhl points out, the Supreme Court
is unlikely to grant certiorari on a statutory question that all the circuits had
agreed upon simply to repudiate a particular lower court’s methodology. Nor
would the Court refuse to grant certiorari on a circuit split involving the
ordinary meaning of a statutory term just because all the circuits had used the
approved dictionary or applied the preferred language canons.48
Finally, separate from concerns regarding adoption of a uniform
interpretive approach, there is support for the affirmative value of divergence
in interpretive methodologies involving different court levels. One argument
emphasizes significant differences in resources. Lower federal courts have
less time than the Supreme Court to devote to interpretation (due to their
much heavier caseloads) and also less access to expertise (in the form of
amicus briefs and the research capacities of multiple law clerks).
Accordingly, it is suggested that these courts must, and should, rely more on
a basic reading of text supplemented by expertise borrowed from judicial
precedent and agency deference, and less on research into legislative or
regulatory histories, than is appropriate for the Supreme Court.49 The
argument based on resource constraints seems especially applicable with
respect to district courts, which deal most often with factual and evidentiary
disputes that do not raise difficult legal issues and which rely heavily on
precedent within their own circuits when resolving contested legal
questions.50
Circuit court cases, where judges, supported by several law clerks, focus
on tougher legal issues presented through an agreed-upon factual record,
seem more analogous to the Supreme Court setting, although they do differ
based on the number of relatively routine cases and the overall number of
cases handled per judge.51 At the same time, both circuit courts and the
Supreme Court may benefit from a more pluralistic approach to statutory
interpretation. The argument is that a broad array of interpretive tools
available to litigants and judges promotes important values besides
uniformity. “Deliberative and transparent contestation” increases the
prospect of achieving sound results, as circuit court judges and Supreme
Court justices discuss and disagree in case-specific settings over the
relevance and weight of text, history, purpose, precedent, or various

47. See Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 1, at 1593–94.
48. See Bruhl, supra note 5, at 11.
49. See Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 470–84 (2012).
50. Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–94
(2009); Bruhl, supra note 1, at 554–55; Bruhl, supra note 5, at 15.
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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canonical presumptions.52 This level of candid debate on methodological
approaches also avoids encouraging judges to hide their real reasoning within
the approach celebrated under a uniformity regime.53
C. Prominent Judges as Promoters of Uniformity
Before turning to the analysis of our dataset, we briefly address whether
certain leading judicial proponents of methodological uniformity have
succeeded in influencing their colleagues on other courts. Although this is
something of an empirical digression from the normative arguments
reviewed in Parts I.A and I.B, its consideration further illustrates the
challenges confronting supporters of a uniform approach.
The most prominent methodological evangelist in recent decades has been
Justice Scalia, whose judicial opinions (as well as books and articles) pressed
for a rigorously textualist approach. Circuit courts, like the Supreme Court,
have become more reliant on text-based tools such as language canons and
dictionaries, and less reliant on legislative history. At the same time, these
changes in the courts of appeals have been less substantial and also less
consistent than in the Supreme Court—varying between circuits and also
regarding particular interpretive resources.54 Moreover, even this lesser
degree of correlation does not amount to causal influence; other factors
besides the writings of Justice Scalia may have played a more important role
in circuit court developments.55
At the appeals court level, perhaps the most prominent advocate for an
interpretive methodology has been Judge Richard Posner on the Seventh
Circuit. As the author of numerous writings dealing in important respects

52. Leib & Serota, supra note 1, at 49–52; Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 1, at 1594;
Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 221, 268–76 (2013).
53. See Leib & Serota, supra note 1, at 61–62.
54. See Canons of Construction, supra note 2, at 29–36 (reporting a substantial increase
in Supreme Court reliance on language canons and a substantial decrease in reliance on
legislative history from the Burger to Rehnquist eras); Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 520–
24 (reporting development of a comfortable dictionary-use culture at the Supreme Court,
extending to liberal justices as well as conservatives in Rehnquist and Roberts eras); Protean
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 700–31 (reporting variable results between circuits
in Roberts Court era regarding reliance on dictionaries and legislative history, and also lower
reliance on both resources in circuit courts than in Supreme Court); Brudney & Baum, supra
note 8, at 105 (reporting that dictionary reliance in Supreme Court from 1986 to 2011 was
substantially higher than circuit court reliance in the same cases—those where Court granted
certiorari on circuit court decisions); Bruhl, supra note 5, at 55–62 (reporting that appeals
courts’ increased citation to language canons and dictionaries and decreased citation to
legislative history from the late 1980s onward parallels that of the Supreme Court but at a
much lower frequency level and concluding that “[w]hatever its shifting fortunes in the
Supreme Court, textualism did not conquer the lower courts”).
55. See Bruhl, supra note 5, at 61 (discussing the possibility that these lower court
responses reflect a strategy of Reagan administration appointments, Justice Department
litigation approaches, or trends in the broader legal culture).
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with statutes and their interpretation,56 Judge Posner is more eclectic than
Justice Scalia in his theoretical approach. At various times, he has advocated
for an imaginative reconstruction analysis based on hypothesized legislative
intent,57 then something of an economics-centered approach,58 and finally a
more case-specific pragmatism.59 At a practical level, Judge Posner was
uncomfortable with the main textualist tools. He disparaged the use of
language canons, deeming them to be essentially mechanical, readily
manipulated, and unrealistic about the legislative process.60 Judge Posner
also criticized the judicial practice of relying on dictionaries;61 in a prior
study we found that he cited to a dictionary in less than one-tenth of one
percent of his statutory majority opinions.62 It seems evident that Judge
Posner was not positively affected by the textualist thinking of Supreme
Court colleagues like Justice Scalia. Yet notwithstanding his own
considerable stature in legal, academic, and judicial circles, there is no reason
to believe that Judge Posner’s scholarly writings or judicial opinions exerted
influence on members of the Supreme Court regarding statutory
interpretation.63
But assuming arguendo that prominent judicial players exert little systemic
influence on colleagues from a higher or lower court, hierarchical relations
may still play some role in the methodological approaches of judges in
specific cases. Consider the recent Second Circuit decision in Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc.,64 addressed to whether Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination in employment applies to discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The court’s en banc majority opinion was written by Chief Judge
Robert Katzmann, a leading purposivist in his decisions and scholarly
writings.65 In ruling that “sex discrimination,” as understood under Title VII,
covers discrimination based on sexual orientation, Judge Katzmann
56. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23; RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996) [hereinafter CHALLENGE AND REFORM]; RICHARD POSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING].
57. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 56, at 286–93.
58. See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1 (1993).
59. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 230–60.
60. See CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 56, at 269–82, 285–86.
61. See REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, supra note 56, at 179–81.
62. See Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 727.
63. We also recognize that what judges describe as their theories of statutory interpretation
may bear little relationship to how they construe statutes in their opinions. Justice Scalia was
notably consistent in this respect. For an example of a judge who was far less consistent, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Learned Hand on Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2018). Merrill describes how Judge Learned Hand adopted and stuck
close to imaginative reconstruction as an interpretive theory for decades in his writings but
not in his circuit court decisions and suggests that “any unitary theory of interpretation . . . is
doomed to failure when it runs up against the messy world of real controversies.” Id. at 16–
17.
64. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Apr. 22, 2019)
(No. 17-1623) (mem.).
65. See KATZMANN, supra note 38, at 29–54 (describing Katzmann’s purposivist
approach); id. at 55–90 (describing three of his Second Circuit opinions as illustrative of this
approach).
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presented a carefully crafted opinion relying heavily and primarily on close
textual analysis.66 A rigorously text-based opinion may be the most cogent
way to reach the conclusion that the majority believed is a correct reading of
Title VII. This approach also may be the most likely to survive Supreme
Court review by the Court’s textualist-oriented conservative majority.67
Whether an appeals court is influenced in its methodological analysis by
anticipating how the justices will analyze the substantive issues in the same
case is one important issue that our empirical inquiry seeks to address.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
As previously discussed, we analyzed reliance by the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals68 on six interpretive resources69 in statutory cases that
the Supreme Court decided on the merits in labor and employment law during
the 1969–2017 Terms.70 Labor and employment cases “are those that
directly address some aspect of the employment relationship under federal
law.”71 Federal labor and employment law is aptly representative in this
interpretive setting. It includes a range of statutes enacted mainly between
66. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–28. The principal dissent, by Judge Gerard Lynch, relied
heavily on legislative history and purpose. See id. at 137–48.
67. Following the Second Circuit decision, the Court granted certiorari in April 2019 and
heard oral argument in October 2019.
68. In the tables below, the Supreme Court is abbreviated as “SC” and the courts of
appeals are abbreviated as “CA.”
69. Although these six resources are well accepted and understood among legal scholars,
judges, and practitioners, we briefly explain them here. “Ordinary meaning” refers to reliance
on a common sense understanding of textual words or phrases, without reference to additional
aids. “Dictionaries” include reliance on general, legal, or occasionally technical dictionary
definitions. “Language canons” encompass reliance on both structural canons (such as the
whole act rule or in pari materia) and sentence-level canons (like noscitur a sociis or the last
antecedent rule). “Legislative history” includes reliance on traditional sources including
conference reports, committee reports, floor statements, and hearings and also on drafting
history—the prior enacted or proposed versions of a statutory provision that a court then
compares with current text being construed. “Purpose” refers to reliance on evidence (from
legislative history or text) that identifies what Congress meant to accomplish: the mischief at
which a law is aimed, the policy justifications imputed to the statute, or the gap or ambiguity
in the legal landscape it seeks to fill or clarify. “Agency deference” refers to reliance on an
agency’s interpretive judgment when construing or applying the contested statutory text—it
could be based on Chevron, Skidmore, or some more subject-matter specific form of
deference. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
70. We coded the cases for reliance on other resources beyond these six. At both judicial
levels, we coded for reliance on substantive canons, Supreme Court precedent, common law
precedent, and legislative inaction. At the appeals court level, we also coded for reliance on
precedent from the same circuit and, separately, precedent from other circuits. We focus on
our six previously identified resources because of their saliency for ongoing debates about
textualist versus purposivist methodologies. In addition, some of the additional resources
were relied on by one or both judicial levels either at a very low frequency (substantive canons,
common law precedent, and legislative inaction) or an extremely high frequency (Supreme
Court precedent), making comparative analyses less fruitful.
71. Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 496 n.25. The criteria for selection of labor and
employment cases are described in greater detail in Canons of Construction, supra note 2, at
15–18.
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the 1930s and 1990s, with the five principal statutory schemes updated
several times.72 Because these laws are enforced through agency rulemaking
and adjudication as well as private rights of action, there is ample scope for
agency deference as a factor.73
The statutes that the Court interpreted in these cases included those dealing
with labor-management relations (such as the National Labor Relations Act74
(NLRA)), those dealing with workplace discrimination (primarily Title VII),
and others such as ERISA and the FLSA. Cases decided solely on the basis
of constitutional issues were excluded, but those with both constitutional and
statutory issues were included.75 Because we sought to compare resource
use by the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals, cases in this field
were included only if they were decided by both courts.76
We included all the cases that met these criteria in the Roberts Court era
(the 2005–2017 Terms). For the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (the 1969–
1985 Terms and 1986–2004 Terms, respectively), we used a sample of onethird of the eligible cases, selecting every third case from a list of cases in
chronological order.77 That sampling was done to capture approximately
equal numbers of cases from the three Courts, primarily because the annual
number of cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts was
considerably higher than the number decided each year by the Roberts
Court.78 Altogether, we analyzed 321 cases: 116 from the Burger Court, 100
from the Rehnquist Court, and 105 from the Roberts Court.
72. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text for a description of the five principal
statutory schemes and the range of other statutes encompassed in our dataset.
73. We have relied entirely or substantially on decisions construing federal labor and
employment laws in prior empirical analyses of interpretive resources at both the Supreme
Court and appeals court levels. See Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2; Oasis or
Mirage, supra note 2; Brudney & Baum, supra note 8; Canons of Construction, supra note 2;
Liberal Justices, supra note 2; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of
Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace
Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
75. We treated cases involving interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
statutory.
76. Thus we omitted cases in which certiorari was granted from a state court decision or
a three-judge district court decision. In a small proportion of the Supreme Court decisions,
4.4 percent of the total, multiple cases decided by courts of appeals were consolidated in the
Court. In these consolidated cases, with one exception, we counted a resource as used in the
court of appeals if the majority opinion in any of the cases relied on the resource. The
exceptional case was Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), where certiorari
was granted on three appeals court decisions. Because one of those decisions relied solely on
precedent while the two others relied on five-to-six additional resources, we coded the
precedent-only decision (which was affirmed) separately from the multiple-resources cases
(which were reversed) in order to preserve analyses under Table 7, infra Part II.C. No other
consolidated appeals court certiorari grants presented this stark contrast linking resources used
to Supreme Court outcome.
77. Because the cases on the list were not prescreened to eliminate those with only
constitutional issues and those with no court of appeals decision, some of the cases chosen by
this method were ineligible for inclusion. Such a case was replaced with the next case or,
where necessary, the closest case in the list that was eligible.
78. The mean numbers of decisions with full opinions per term were 146 for the Burger
Court, 101 for the Rehnquist Court, and 76 for the Roberts Court through the 2017 Term.
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The majority opinions in each Supreme Court decision and corresponding
court of appeals decision were read in order to ascertain reliance on the six
interpretive resources that we analyzed.79 At the outset, it is important to
define what we mean by reliance. When an opinion refers to a resource, its
use of that resource can range from a passing mention to substantive
deflection as being of no probative value to treatment as determinative in the
case. Our criterion was whether an opinion relied on the resource as one
basis for its decision: whether the resource contributed in a meaningful way
to the majority’s justification for its holding. Thus, reliance is considerably
more than mere citation or use, though it may well be less than dispositive
invocation.80 The reliance criterion has been used in a series of studies that
were predecessors to this one.81
A. General Patterns in Reliance on Resources
We began by getting a general picture of the relative frequencies of
reliance for the six resources in the Supreme Court and courts of appeals. We
looked first at the full set of 321 cases and then broke the cases down by
statute, by the Supreme Court’s treatment of the appeals court decision, and
by the direction of the Court’s decision in relation to the employer and
employee.
Table 1 shows the overall frequency with which the courts relied on these
resources. For three of the six resources, dictionaries, language canons, and
legislative history, the frequencies for the two levels were quite similar. In
one sense, those similarities are unsurprising, because the two levels of courts
were deciding the same cases. Yet the similarities are noteworthy in light of
what might be considered the collective agenda of the Supreme Court, an
These figures were calculated from table I(A) in the “Statistics” articles in the November
issues of volumes 84 to 132 of the Harvard Law Review (1970–2018). The share of the
Roberts Court’s agenda devoted to labor and employment cases was also somewhat lower than
the shares for the Burger and Rehnquist Courts; the labor and employment cases in our initial
dataset constituted 14.1 percent of the Burger Court agenda, 15.6 percent of the Rehnquist
Court agenda, and 12.7 percent of the Roberts Court agenda. Finally, the Roberts Court
through the 2017 Term was somewhat shorter (thirteen terms) than the Burger (seventeen
terms) and Rehnquist (nineteen terms) Courts.
79. When there was no majority opinion in the Supreme Court, the plurality opinion was
used instead. In Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co. (In re
Howard Delivery Service, Inc.), 403 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 651 (2006),
there was no majority opinion but instead two concurring opinions for the majority. Those
two opinions together were treated as the equivalent of a majority opinion.
80. There is certainly value in empirical analyses of judicial reasoning based on frequency
of citation rather than reliance. See generally Bruhl, supra note 5. One thing citation analysis
cannot reveal, though, is a link to judicial outcomes: whether a citation reflects use of a
resource that the opinion author supports or one that the author rejects as inconclusive,
unpersuasive, or even incorrect. Because we examine the relationship between judicial
reasoning and judicial outcomes as part of our empirical assessment, see Table 3 infra Part
II.B and accompanying text and Table 7 infra Part II.C and accompanying text, we have
focused on resources used to advance those outcomes.
81. See Canons of Construction, supra note 2, at 24–26 for the most complete explanation
of interpretive reliance. See also Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 705;
Liberal Justices, supra note 2, at 129.
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agenda that has been driven primarily by conservative justices: emphasis on
language canons and dictionaries as a means to discern the meaning of
statutes and considerable distrust of legislative history as a guide to that
meaning.
Table 1: Frequency of Reliance on Selected Resources in All Cases
Resource
Ordinary Meaning
Dictionaries
Language Canons
Legislative History
Legislative Purpose
Agency Deference

SC Cases (%)
61.1
9.0
23.1
35.8
74.1
17.1

CA Cases (%)
78.2
7.2
24.0
35.2
48.0
23.4

Differences in reliance on agency deference can be interpreted in different
ways, depending on whether we focus on the simple difference in frequency
of use (6 percentage points) or on the ratio between the frequencies (37
percent higher in the courts of appeals). But by both criteria, the courts of
appeals relied on agency deference more often than the Supreme Court did.
The difference may reflect the fact that agency deference is regarded, albeit
perhaps unconsciously, as an efficient case-management resource for circuit
courts that must cope with very heavy dockets. By contrast, the Supreme
Court’s docket is rather light,82 and the justices benefit from having more
time and lawyer input to look beyond the agency’s interpretive position.
Differences in reliance between the two levels of courts were substantial
for ordinary meaning and even greater for legislative purpose.83 Those
differences are certainly surprising in light of the textualist agenda of some
justices: we would not have expected court of appeals judges to rely more
heavily on ordinary meaning than the higher court or for the Supreme Court
to rely more heavily on evidence of legislative purpose. The circuit courts’
lower frequency of reliance on purpose (like their higher reliance on ordinary
meaning and agency deference) may reflect attention to case-management
priorities. Circuit judges may regard simpler interpretive frameworks as
more compatible with their workloads, whereas the Supreme Court has more
time to devote to interpretive analysis, and briefs from parties and amici often
assist with the comparatively labor-intensive task of unearthing or discerning
purpose.84

82. See supra notes 3–4 for data.
83. For ordinary meaning, the difference between the two levels was 17 percentage points
and the frequency of use by the courts of appeals was 28 percent higher than the Supreme
Court. For legislative purpose, the corresponding differences were 26 percentage points and
54 percent.
84. See Merrill, supra note 63, at 7–8 (discussing the significant epistemic demands on a
judge when reconstructing the context of a historical enactment).
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Patterns of reliance on resources may vary among statutes because of
attributes such as the clarity with which the laws are written, the
extensiveness of their legislative history, and the number of times they have
been updated by Congress. The relative frequency with which certain
resources are relied on at the two court levels may also vary with the
attributes of statutes. To probe these possibilities, we identified five statutes
or sets of related statutes that were frequent subjects of labor and employment
cases: (1) NLRA, the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act85 that
modified the NLRA, and the Railway Labor Act86 (RLA), an analogue of the
NLRA for the airline and railroad industries; (2) Title VII and its
amendments; (3) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196787
(ADEA) and its amendments; (4) ERISA and its amendments; and (5) the
FLSA and its amendments. Altogether, 64 percent of the 321 cases involved
interpretation of one of these statutes.88
Comparison of the five sets of statutes indicated that there were few
dramatic differences among them. However, some of the differences are of
interest. For three of the sets of statutes, there were enough cases for us to
be confident that the courts’ proportionate reliance on particular resources
was meaningful. Table 2 shows the frequency with which the two levels
relied on our six resources for cases involving those three sets of statutes.

85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012).
86. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012).
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
88. The NLRA and RLA were interpreted in seventy-two cases, Title VII in sixty-six
cases, ERISA in thirty-six cases, ADEA in eighteen cases, and FLSA in sixteen cases. Four
cases involved the interpretation of two of these five sets of statutes. These cases were
included in both of the two categories. The other 36 percent of the cases involved
interpretation of numerous statutes where the interests of employees or employers were at
stake. These include the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977; the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978; the Federal Arbitration Act; the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; the False
Claims Act; and statutes enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code, the Criminal Code, the Tax
Code, and the Immigration Code.

842

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Table 2: Frequency of Reliance on Resources, Selected Statutes

Ordinary
Meaning
Dictionaries
Language
Canons
Legislative
History
Legislative
Purpose
Agency
Deference

NLRA/RLA
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

Title VII
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

ERISA
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

41.7

65.3

62.1

71.2

72.2

86.1

1.4

2.8

7.6

7.6

8.3

8.3

12.5

15.3

24.2

22.7

13.9

25.0

30.6

29.2

33.3

25.8

33.3

41.7

81.9

44.4

74.2

43.9

72.2

52.8

25.0

34.7

9.1

15.2

11.1

16.7

If the statutes themselves evoked different emphases on particular
resources, we would expect that effect to be manifested at both court levels.
Only two of the six resources showed such a pattern, and both involved the
NLRA.89 Of greater interest to us is variation in the relative weight of
particular resources at the two court levels. With one qualification, there is
not a substantial variation across statutes in this respect.90 Thus the relative
frequency with which the Supreme Court and courts of appeals rely on
different interpretive resources is not shaped substantially by the statutes they
interpret.
The qualification involves reliance on two resources under ERISA. The
appeals courts rely on language canons about twice as often as the Supreme
Court does for ERISA cases, in contrast to virtual equivalence for the two
other statutes. Additionally, the appeals courts rely on legislative history
more than the Supreme Court in these same ERISA cases, by about a 25
89. There was heavier reliance on agency deference in cases involving the NLRA and its
related statutes. This is probably due primarily to the fact that there is no private right of
action under the NLRA. Because every case involves the agency as a litigant, courts are
effectively required to address deference questions on a more regular basis than under Title
VII and ERISA, where private rights of action exist and most cases on appeal involve private
parties on both sides. There also was lighter reliance on dictionaries for the NLRA and related
statutes. We suspect this is due to the fact that a large majority of NLRA-related cases arose
in the Burger era, before the Supreme Court began to utilize dictionary-based interpretive
analysis. See Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 495 (noting that the Burger Court cited to
dictionaries an average of five cases per term from 1969 to 1986).
90. For instance, the higher level of reliance on ordinary meaning in the courts of appeals
is reproduced for all three sets of statutes, though the difference is greater for the NLRA than
it is for the other two statutes. There is a similar pattern for legislative purpose: although the
gap between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals is lower for ERISA than for the
other two sets of statutes, it is at least 19 percentage points across all three statutes.
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percent margin, whereas the circuit courts invoke legislative history the same
or less than the Supreme Court for the two other statutes.
On language canons, a possible explanation involves the length and
labyrinthine complexity of ERISA,91 which allows for and perhaps invites
reliance on structural canons such as the whole act rule, meaningful variation,
in pari materia, and expressio unius. In the appeals courts, where ordinary
meaning reliance is generally higher than for the Supreme Court, the
particular complexity of ERISA terms and provisions may have encouraged
a stronger interest in language canons to help unpack that meaning.
Additionally, ERISA, enacted in 1974, did not reach the Supreme Court until
the 1980s: the bulk of interpretive decisions occurred in the Rehnquist and
Roberts eras, which are halcyon years for language canons. By contrast, both
NLRA and Title VII decisions are concentrated in the Burger and early
Rehnquist eras,92 when language canons had not yet become as prevalent a
part of the circuit courts’ interpretive menus.
We are less clear about the reasons for the modestly greater reliance on
legislative history by the appeals courts. Perhaps the challenging aspects of
ERISA textual provisions have led the circuit courts to search for clarification
or confirmation in accompanying committee reports and floor discussions.
Then too, ERISA has been repeatedly amended since 1974 on issues related
to health care, pension protections, welfare plans, and taxation,93 giving rise
in comparative terms to many more instances of legislative history for
appeals courts to consider. This consideration largely occurred in a period
when the Supreme Court became less interested in consulting legislative
history.94
We have already noted the extent to which debates between competing
approaches to statutory interpretation in the courts and in the legal
community fall along ideological lines: conservatives tend to favor
textualism, a tendency that has become stronger over time, while liberals tend
to favor purposive approaches that take into account legislative intent and
goals. That disagreement is highlighted by the long-running debate between
Justice Stephen Breyer and the late Justice Antonin Scalia.95 Their debate
reflects a belief, albeit one that is usually implicit rather than explicit, that the
competing approaches favor different outcomes. For this reason, we might
91. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)
(referring to ERISA as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute”); see also Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981) (same).
92. See James J. Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor and
Employment Law Decisions of the Supreme Court’s 1999–2000 Term, 16 LAB. LAW. 151
(2000).
93. ERISA was enacted in 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). It has been amended in 1980, 1984, 1986, 1989,
1994, 1996, 1998, 2008, and on other occasions.
94. See Canons of Construction, supra note 2, at 32–33, 35–36.
95. Compare STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2008), and Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992), with SCALIA, supra note 37, and SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 41.
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expect a correlation between reliance on particular resources and the
ideological direction of decisions, either because resources associated with
the competing approaches lead to different outcomes, because pro-employer
and pro-employee opinions draw on different resources as justifications for
the outcomes they reach, or simply because conservative justices tend to
write pro-employer opinions and liberals tend to write pro-employee
opinions.96
The direct relationships between justices’ ideological positions and their
reliance on interpretive resources identified as textualist or purposivist in our
sample of labor and employment cases are mixed. Those relationships are
best illuminated by comparison of liberal and conservative justices in the
Roberts Court, which sits during a time when the debates over interpretive
methods are well established. Liberal justices are more likely than their
conservative colleagues to rely on the three resources associated with
purposivism, and the differences for legislative history would be much
sharper if Justice Kennedy was excluded from analysis.97 But there were
minimal differences between conservatives and liberals in reliance on the
resources associated with textualism, and liberals were actually a little more
likely to employ ordinary meaning and dictionary definitions.
In labor and employment law, cases typically involve conflicts between
the interests of employers and those of employees. Of course, conservatives
are more favorable to employers’ interests and liberals to employees’
interests. Thus, we coded decisions according to whether they favored the
interests of employers or of employees.98
96. In our Roberts Court cases, leaving aside per curiam decisions, 72 percent of the proemployer majority opinions were written by justices who are generally identified as
conservative; in contrast, 65 percent of the pro-employee majority opinions were written by
justices identified as liberals. These percentages, and those presented in infra note 98, exclude
per curiam decisions.
97. Liberal justices relied on legislative history 32 percent of the time, compared with 20
percent for conservatives (and 11 percent for conservatives if Justice Kennedy is excluded).
Liberals relied on legislative purpose 77 percent of the time, compared with 52 percent for
conservatives. The difference for agency deference was smaller, 20 percent versus 14 percent.
For ordinary meaning, the reliance rate was 71 percent for conservatives, 77 percent for
liberals; for dictionaries, the reliance rate was 20 percent for conservatives, 23 percent for
liberals; for language canons, the reliance rate was 38 percent for conservatives, 36 percent
for liberals.
98. In the great majority of cases, this coding was straightforward and unambiguous.
However, some cases contained ambiguities. When unions were in contention with
employees, cases were coded as pro-employer or pro-employee based on whether the union’s
position was consistent with the interests of most employees. The same rule was used when
employees were on both sides of a case. There were some cases in which these rules did not
resolve an ambiguity, and in eighteen Supreme Court cases (5.6 percent of the total), no
direction was coded and the case was omitted from this analysis. We did not code the direction
of court of appeals decisions directly; rather, direction was determined by the direction of the
Supreme Court decision and the Court’s disposition of the court of appeals decision (i.e.,
whether the Court affirmed or instead reversed or vacated the decision under review). There
likely are a few cases in which this rule mischaracterized the court of appeals decision. There
were three cases with multiple court of appeals decisions in which those decisions differed in
direction, so these cases were omitted from the analysis at the court of appeals level. Thus a
total of twenty-one cases were not included in this analysis.
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The results are shown in Table 3. Ten of the twelve relationships between
decision direction and reliance on particular resources are in the direction
that we would expect based on our identification of the first three resources
with textualism and the last three with purposivism. But these relationships
are weak, with the exception of a notable pro-employee tilt associated with
reliance on legislative history and agency deference in the courts of appeals.
The pro-employee results for legislative history may reflect the fact that
because major statutes in the labor and employment arena were all enacted
to protect or promote the interests of workers, the legislative record evidence
accompanying these laws will tend to be consonant with that pro-worker
legislative intent. That trend has been muted in the Supreme Court, due at
least in part to Justice Scalia’s intractable hostility to legislative history and
liberal justices’ consequent reluctance to invoke that resource when Scalia
was on their side.99 Similarly, the agencies charged with applying and
enforcing these major statutes (National Labor Relations Board, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Department of Labor) also tend to
be pro-employee when implementing their congressional mission; circuit
courts’ deference to their judgment—more frequent in general than Supreme
Court deference—may well reflect that direction.
There is also a partial exception for dictionaries. Although we do not want
to exaggerate the relationship for dictionary use, it is noteworthy that nearly
two-thirds of the opinions that relied on dictionaries at the court of appeals
level and more than two-thirds at the Supreme Court level were in support of
conservative outcomes.100

99. See Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 718, 721–22 (discussing workarounds to relying on legislative history, created especially by liberal justices, in order to retain
Scalia’s support); Liberal Justices, supra note 2, at 160–69 (discussing a “Scalia effect,”
leading liberal justices to rely less on legislative history when authoring majorities that Scalia
joins, even though the prevailing party briefs rely heavily on such history).
100. Like some other differences we have cited, see supra Table 1, the differences in
dictionary use between pro-employer and pro-employee decisions appear to be considerably
greater when ratios of use in the two types of decisions are calculated than when differences
in percentage points are calculated.
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Table 3: Frequency of Reliance on Resources by Case Outcome
SC Cases (%)
ProProemployer
employee
Ordinary
Meaning
Dictionaries
Language
Canons
Legislative
History
Legislative
Purpose
Agency
Deference

CA Cases (%)
ProProemployer
employee

64.3

59.5

78.8

77.3

12.1

7.4

9.5

5.5

25.7

20.9

21.2

24.5

37.9

35.0

27.7

39.3

70.7

77.9

43.1

49.1

17.1

17.2

13.9

29.5

We investigated one other possible relationship between ideology and
reliance on particular resources. Justices and judges might well be more
inclined to invoke agency deference when the current presidential
administration matches their ideological leanings. One study found that
Supreme Court justices and court of appeals judges were more likely to
validate administrative agency policies when the presidential administration
was on the same side of the ideological divide as that of the justice or
judge.101 Although reliance on particular interpretive resources is different
from votes on the outcome of cases, there is some reason to posit that judges
are more likely to invoke deference to administrative agencies when they are
sympathetic to the administration on ideological grounds.
A test of this hypothesis based on the proportions of cases in which justices
and judges invoke agency deference is necessarily imperfect because agency
deference is not relevant to all statutory decisions. Still, those proportions
provide a meaningful test.102 We classified justices as liberals and
conservatives on the basis of their overall voting tendencies in cases
involving labor and employment issues; we classified judges on the basis of
the party of their appointing president.103 As it turned out, the posited
relationship did not exist at either level.
101. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006).
102. There is no reason to think that the relevance of agency deference differs between
cases in which the court’s opinion is written by liberals and those in which the opinion is
written by conservatives. During the post-Chevron period for our dataset (1984–2018), when
agency deference was perhaps a more salient interpretive resource, presidential
administrations were Democratic and Republican in roughly equal proportions (sixteen years
Democratic and eighteen years Republican). For the period preceding Chevron (1969–84),
presidential administrations were Republican for nine years and Democratic for four.
103. We coded justices’ ideological tendencies on the basis of their votes in cases falling
within issue area 7 (unions) and issues 20060 (employment discrimination), 20140 (sex
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In the Supreme Court, conservative justices were more likely than liberals
to invoke agency deference under a Republican president, and liberal justices
were a little more likely to invoke it under a Democratic president, but the
differences were small.104 In the courts of appeals, the relationships were
actually in the opposite direction from what we posited, although again of
small magnitude.105
This certainly does not mean that judges and justices were responding to
cases in which they relied on agency deference on a nonideological basis:
when liberal judges and justices wrote their court’s opinion in these cases,
the court was distinctly more likely to rule in favor of employees than it was
in cases with a conservative author.106 Still, the nonappearance of the posited
relationship between ideology and reliance on agency deference suggests that
judges and justices do not perceive that resource in ideological terms.
B. Temporal Patterns and Supreme Court Influence
Interpretive resources may wax and wane over time. As textualism gained
a stronger foothold in the Supreme Court, largely through the advocacy of
Justice Scalia, the Court’s reliance on legislative history declined.107 The
growing popularity of textualism also helps to explain the dramatic growth
in reliance on dictionaries to interpret statutory language.108 Beyond our
interest in the relationship between resource use in the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals, it is valuable to provide a broader picture of changes in
discrimination in employment), and 40030 (due process, hearing, government employees) in
the Supreme Court Database. See SUP. CT. DATABASE, supra note 6. Although percentages of
liberal and conservative decisions are not fully comparable over time, the percentages for the
justices comported well with the perceptions of scholars and other observers. Three justices
(John Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Sandra Day O’Connor) were omitted from the
analysis because their scores suggested that they should be characterized as moderates rather
than liberals or conservatives. Following Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, supra note
101, at 826–27, we coded court of appeals judges on the basis of the party of their appointing
president. For decisions, we characterized the president’s party on the basis of the time of the
Court’s decision, but we omitted decisions that came during the first year of a president’s
tenure because judges or justices might not necessarily identify those cases with the new
administration.
104. The proportions were as follows: Republican president/conservative justice, 25.0
percent; Republican president/liberal justice, 21.4 percent; Democratic president/conservative
justice, 12.7 percent; Democratic president/liberal justice, 15.9 percent.
105. The proportions were as follows: Republican president/Republican appointee, 19.4
percent; Republican president/Democratic appointee, 28.6 percent; Democratic
president/Republican appointee, 30.8 percent; Democratic president/Democratic appointee,
25.0 percent.
106. In the Supreme Court, 63.6 percent of the decisions invoking agency deference with
liberal authors favored employees, compared with 35.3 percent for conservative authors. In
the courts of appeals, the comparable rates were 80.0 percent for authors appointed by
Democratic presidents and 62.1 percent for those appointed by Republicans. The percentages
for the Supreme Court were similar to those for all cases in the dataset; for the courts of
appeals, the percentages of pro-employee decisions across all cases were distinctly lower for
both Republican and Democratic appointees (43.2 percent and 67.9 percent, respectively) and
the interparty difference was greater.
107. See Canons of Construction, supra note 2; Liberal Justices, supra note 2.
108. Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 494–96.
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reliance on all six interpretive resources as a means to gauge the impact of
the rise of textualism on choices to use these resources by judges in the
federal appellate courts.
To the extent that trends in the reliance on interpretive resources occur,
they are likely to occur in both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.
One reason is that judges at the two levels are subject to similar influences.
Thus, for instance, the growing prominence of textualism as reflected in legal
scholarship and pedagogy might have affected the thinking and practices of
both Supreme Court justices and court of appeals judges.109 The other reason
is that court of appeals judges may be influenced by reliance on resources in
the Supreme Court. For one thing, court of appeals judges may follow the
lead of the Supreme Court because they are convinced by the justices’
rationales. Alternatively, or in addition, they may feel obliged to follow that
lead, either because they believe it is their duty to do so or because they think
the justices are more likely to approve of decisions that reflect the justices’
own methodological preferences. The goal of minimizing reversals is
especially relevant to the cases that the Court ultimately decides because a
substantial majority of these cases are ones in which court of appeals judges
could anticipate the possibility of Supreme Court review.
We can begin our examination of trends in the two judicial levels by
dividing our study period by chief justice. The results are shown in Table 4.
Comparison of the Burger and Roberts Courts indicates a general similarity
in trends between the two levels. Reliance on ordinary meaning, dictionaries,
and language canons increased; reliance on legislative history and legislative
purpose declined; there was little change in reliance on agency deference.
The lack of increase in agency deference at both judicial levels is notable
given that near the end of the Burger era, the Supreme Court announced its
so-called Chevron revolution,110 putatively expanding the scope for agency
deference over its previous Skidmore-based approach.111

109. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 575–603, 634–656 (2d ed. 1995); Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 64. See
generally SCALIA, supra note 37.
110. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Thomas
Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
111. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Table 4: Frequency of Resource Reliance by Chief Justice Eras

Ordinary
Meaning
Dictionaries
Language
Canons
Legislative
History
Legislative
Purpose
Agency
Deference

Burger
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

Rehnquist
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

Roberts
SC
CA
Cases Cases
(%)
(%)

52.6

70.7

59.0

83.0

72.4

81.9

0.0

0.9

8.0

6.0

20.0

15.2

12.9

24.1

22.0

13.0

35.2

34.3

46.6

39.7

36.0

35.0

23.8

30.5

83.6

61.2

77.0

40.0

61.0

41.0

18.1

24.1

17.0

24.0

16.2

21.9

The increases and declines are consistent with what we would expect from
the growing popularity of textualism over time. As we noted earlier, past
studies have found some evidence of these trends for dictionaries and
legislative history;112 the findings shown in Table 4 provide a much fuller
picture, documenting the considerable impact of changes in thinking about
modes of statutory interpretation within the legal community and the courts.
The trends have not taken identical form in the two levels of courts. With
the exception of legislative purpose, increases and decreases in reliance on
particular resources were more pronounced in the Supreme Court. For
ordinary meaning and legislative purpose, change came earlier in the courts
of appeals, and from the start the appeals courts were ahead of the Supreme
Court in relying on ordinary meaning and eschewing legislative purpose.
Reliance on language canons grew steadily in the Supreme Court, but in the
courts of appeals, that reliance declined in the Rehnquist Court era and then
sharply increased in the Roberts Court era.113

112. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text; Bruhl, supra note 5, at 59–60.
113. The Roberts-era appeals court cases involving language canons feature by far the
highest number of instances where those courts rely on more than one language canon: this
occurs 60 percent of the time, as compared with 15 percent for Rehnquist-era appeals court
cases and 18 percent for Burger-era appeals court decisions. Roberts-era appeals courts also
rely on a considerably wider range of language canons than their earlier counterparts.
Although the whole act rule (and its corollaries) has been the most prevalent canon during all
three eras in the appeals courts, it has become less dominant since 2005. Twelve other
language canons have been relied on in the Roberts years, compared with five others in both
the Rehnquist and Burger eras. These differences suggest that appeals courts have adopted a
more robust approach to language canons over time, perhaps influenced by the expanded
Supreme Court reliance that began during the Rehnquist years.
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These broad patterns suggest that covariation in temporal trends between
the two court levels was substantial but imperfect. That possibility indicates
the value of looking more closely at those trends by breaking down the time
periods more finely—specifically, by year. A finer-grained analysis gives us
a better picture of covariation, and by doing so it allows us to distinguish
between the two possible reasons for covariation that we have described. If
justices and judges are responding to similar influences, we would expect
that trends would track each other most closely if we compare patterns of
resource use in the same years. If judges are influenced by the Supreme
Court, we would expect some lag in the linkage between the trends at the two
levels; for instance, increases or decreases in the courts of appeals might tend
to occur three-to-five years after similar increases or decreases in the
Supreme Court. Of course, we would not expect anything like a perfect
correlation between trends, with or without a time lag. But we can look to
see whether there is a substantial correlation between trends at the two levels
and, if so, whether the correlation is higher with or without a lag.
One reason to expect an imperfect correlation is the limited number of
cases in our study, an average of six or seven cases per year. That small
number leaves considerable room for random variation, especially because
the Supreme Court decisions in a given year are not in the same cases that
the courts of appeals decided in that year.114 To limit the impact of that
random variation, we computed a measure of reliance rate for each year that
took into account reliance rates in the years immediately contiguous to the
year in question.115
Because there was no general trend over time in reliance on agency
deference, we did not analyze correlations for that resource. Table 5 shows
the correlations for the other five resources.

114. The time between the court of appeals decision in a case and the Supreme Court
decision is typically one or two years. Among the cases in our study, 94 percent of the
Supreme Court decisions came either one or two calendar years after the court of appeals
decision.
115. Specifically, we computed a measure of reliance rate for each year that also
incorporated the year before and the year after, though giving double weight to the year in
question. Thus, for 2015, the use rate was calculated as follows: (year 2014 use rate × 0.25)
+ (year 2015 use rate × 0.50) + (year 2016 use rate × 0.25). The analysis of correlations was
limited to the years for which this reliance rate could be calculated (1971–2016). (1970 was
eliminated because there was only one Supreme Court decision in the dataset in 1969; 2017
was eliminated because there were no court of appeals decisions in the dataset in 2018.).
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Table 5: Correlations Between Annual Rates of Reliance on Resources by
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1971–2016116
Lag (in Years) Between Rates in SC and CA117
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Ordinary Meaning

.070

.077

.114

.239

.289

.254

.245

Dictionaries

.528

.645

.527

.291

.221

.352

.523

Language Canons

-.062

.017

.025

.104

.291

.312

.137

Legislative History

.003

.138

.236

.377

.592

.725

.635

Legislative Purpose

.302

.366

.403

.317

.177

.145

.262

These correlations should be interpreted with some caution. For one thing,
they may reflect idiosyncratic factors rather than systematic relationships.118
Accordingly, one or two correlations for a resource that are quite different
from the other correlations should be heavily discounted. Further, the highest
correlations for ordinary meaning and language canons are not very
strong.119
Even with suitable cautions in mind, the patterns in the correlations still
provide support for several conclusions. First, all but one of the thirty-five
correlations are positive, and all five resources have meaningful positive

116. The highest correlation for each resource is in bold.
117. The lag is the number of years between the Supreme Court’s rate of reliance on a
resource and the courts of appeals’ rate of reliance on the resource, with the court of appeals
years coming later. To take one example, for correlations with a one-year lag, the Supreme
Court’s use for 1972–2015 is compared with the courts of appeals’ use for 1973–2016.
118. But cf. Bruhl, supra note 1, at 503 (finding that correlations between citation rates at
the two levels were higher if they were lagged by a couple of years). The effect of idiosyncrasy
is illustrated by the correlations for agency deference, which we do not present in Table 5
because there was no general trend in reliance on that resource. The correlations are negative
for the lags from no years through four years; the highest of these correlations is -.417 for a
two-year lag. Such a negative correlation is not susceptible to a meaningful explanation; in
all likelihood, it is an artifact of the lack of clear trends in either the Supreme Court or the
courts of appeals.
119. The correlation squared represents the proportion of the variation in one variable that
can be explained statistically by variation in the other variable. MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN &
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 31, 33 (2001). Thus, the correlation of .312 for
language canons with a five-year lag indicates that only 10 percent of the variation in the use
rate for the courts of appeals is explained statistically by the Supreme Court rate. The highest
correlation for legislative purpose corresponds to explanation of only 16 percent of the
variation. The higher correlations for dictionaries and legislative history show more powerful
explanation—42 percent for dictionaries and 53 percent for legislative history. As with other
descriptive statistical relationships, explanation in a statistical sense does not necessarily mean
explanation in a causal sense.
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correlations for multiple years. Clearly, trends in the courts of appeals are
not fully independent of trends in the Supreme Court.
Second, the pattern of correlations for the various lags supports different
conclusions for different resources. For ordinary meaning, language canons,
and legislative history, the increases or decreases in reliance on particular
resources came first in the Supreme Court and only later in the courts of
appeals. The steady increases in the correlations up to a four-year lag for
ordinary meaning and a five-year lag for language canons and legislative
history are striking. This suggests that circuit courts may have been
influenced by the Supreme Court’s greater enthusiasm for ordinary meaning
and language canons and its diminished appetite for legislative history.
For legislative purpose, the trends in the two levels of courts appear to be
close to simultaneous, suggesting that the two judicial levels were likely
affected by similar “outside” factors rather than the circuits being responsive
to Supreme Court changes.120 For dictionaries, there is some evidence of
simultaneity, but the high correlation with a six-year lag complicates the
picture.
Finally, the correlations for dictionaries and legislative history reach levels
so high that they are very unlikely to be idiosyncratic. For legislative history,
the time lag strongly suggests that court of appeals judges responded to the
Supreme Court’s movement away from reliance on that resource. That
conclusion is consistent with the declines at both court levels in the frequency
of reliance on legislative history from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist
Court and from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court, as shown in Table
4. The patterns in that table also make clear something that the correlations
cannot show: the decline in reliance on legislative history was far more
substantial in the Supreme Court than it was in the courts of appeals—23
percentage points versus 9 percentage points. As a result, while the Supreme
Court relied more frequently on legislative history than the courts of appeals
in the Burger era, the opposite has been true in the Roberts era. If the
Supreme Court influenced reliance on legislative history in the courts of
appeals, as the correlations indicate, that influence was limited in magnitude.
For dictionaries, as we have noted, the correlations do not point to as clear
a picture. The highest correlation was with a one-year lag, which suggests
that the Supreme Court and courts of appeals acted more or less
simultaneously.121 However, the high correlation with a six-year lag
120. Possible “outside” factors include (a) an increased number of congressional overrides
from the 1970s to the late 1990s, along with growing criticism of activist courts, resulting in
a desire to reduce reliance on a search for legislative purpose that reinforces perceptions of
judges as untrammeled policymakers and (b) developments in scholarship and pedagogy,
emphasizing the role of close textual analysis. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 109, at
575–603, 634–656. See generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014); Easterbrook, supra note 39; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
121. We calculated correlations with “reverse lags,” so that rates of dictionary use in the
courts of appeals were compared with rates of use in the Supreme Court in later years. With
a one-year reverse lag, the correlation was .362; with a two-year reverse lag, the correlation
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suggests the possibility that court of appeals judges responded to the trend in
the Supreme Court. The seven- and eight-year lags reinforce this possibility:
the correlation reached another peak at seven years (.582) before declining a
little at eight years (.517). Thus both Supreme Court influence and
simultaneous change should be left open as possibilities, though acceptance
of the latter possibility would require us to identify the source of a
simultaneous response.122 In any event, Table 4 shows that in contrast with
legislative history, the change in reliance on dictionary definitions in the
courts of appeals was nearly as great in magnitude as the change in the
Supreme Court.
C. Co-reliance on Resources
Up to this point, we have focused on patterns of reliance on particular
resources in aggregated sets of cases. But we can gain important additional
insight into resource use by examining the extent to which the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals rely on the same resources when they decide the
same specific case. We begin by considering what we call “co-reliance” in
terms of our six categories: to what extent do the two levels of courts rely
on resources such as language canons or legislative history in the same cases?
Reliance on language canons or on legislative history reflects a distinct
modality of judicial reasoning. We are interested in how often the Supreme
Court and appeals courts both invoke such a modality for the same case; we
also want to know whether this co-reliance occurs more often in cases of
affirmance than reversal, and whether its frequency has increased or
decreased between the Burger and the Roberts eras.
Then we will consider co-reliance in terms of specific versions of
resources. For instance, when both judicial levels invoke legislative history
or language canons, to what extent do the Supreme Court and the circuit court
rely on the same source of legislative history or the same language canon?
This sense of co-reliance addresses a more refined aspect of judicial
reasoning, implicating tensions or disagreements within a particular modality
such as language canons. In addition, addressing co-reliance for specific
versions of a resource effectively invites a more doctrinal analysis of how
that resource is applied in individual cases, an analysis we undertake in
illustrative terms in Part III.
At the level of our categories of resources, even if the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals both relied on a particular resource randomly across the
was .291. When these correlations are compared with those shown in Table 5, they reinforce
the appearance of simultaneous change.
122. Simultaneous change in dictionary use might reflect the factors that are relevant to
legislative purpose, discussed in supra note 120. Such a change also may reflect a felt need
by generalist federal judges to avoid error or embarrassment when faced with information
overload from increasingly long and complex statutes. See Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at
498–501. A possible further source would be an increasing tendency to include citations to
dictionaries in the briefs presented to the federal appellate courts. Such a tendency could have
resulted from a perception that with the growing popularity of textualism, judges and justices
were becoming more receptive to textualist evidence such as dictionary definitions.
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cases they decided, there would still be co-reliance in some cases. But there
are three reasons to posit that co-reliance will occur at a higher rate than if it
was simply random. First, judges and justices may respond systematically to
the attributes of cases by relying on the resources that are most relevant to
resolution of the statutory issues in those cases. Second, in crafting Supreme
Court opinions, justices and their clerks may be influenced by the content of
the court of appeals opinions that they are reviewing. Indeed, it is common
for the Court’s opinions to incorporate language directly from lower court
opinions.123 Third, when court of appeals judges anticipate that the Supreme
Court is likely to review their decision, they may employ the resources that
they perceive the justices think the most appropriate.
There is no perfect measure of co-reliance because the different measures
that might be used reflect different perspectives on co-reliance and because
every measure is biased by the frequency with which a resource is relied
on.124 We will employ two fairly simple measures that have relatively small
biases and that provide different perspectives on co-reliance.125 The first is
the difference in the frequency with which the Supreme Court relied on a
resource when the court of appeals also relied on the resource, compared with
cases in which the court of appeals did not rely on the resource.126 The
second is the difference between the frequency of co-reliance that actually
occurs and the frequency that would be expected if the relationship between
reliance on a resource by the two levels of courts was only random.127
The results are shown in Table 6. Because of the ways that our two
measures get at co-reliance, the differences in Supreme Court reliance on a
resource depending on court of appeals reliance on the same resource are
more striking than the differences between random and actual co-reliance for
each resource. Taking the two measures together, we think that the data
support two conclusions about these resources as a whole. The first is that
there is a meaningful relationship between reliance on these interpretive
resources by the Supreme Court and by the courts of appeals. One or more
of the possible reasons for convergence between the two levels of courts in
the same cases operate in practice.
123. Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S.
Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31, 37–38 (2011); Adam Feldman, Opinion
Construction in the Roberts Court, 39 LAW & POL’Y 192, 197–98, 202–03 (2017).
124. For resources with a sufficient frequency of reliance—such as ordinary meaning or
legislative purpose—a considerable amount of co-reliance would occur on a random basis.
Our interest is in identifying and understanding patterns of co-reliance that are more than
random. Some measures are biased by the simple frequency of reliance, others by the
deviation of the frequency from a 50 percent use rate.
125. Despite the conceptual differences between these measures, their values across the six
resources correlate highly, at .822.
126. That difference is measured in percentage points, comparing the proportion of cases
in which the Supreme Court uses a resource between cases in which the court of appeals relied
on the resource and those in which it did not.
127. The proportion of cases with co-reliance based on a random relationship between use
by the two levels is calculated as the proportion of cases with use by the Supreme Court
multiplied by the proportion of cases with use by the court of appeals. We calculated the
difference between random and actual use in percentage points.
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Table 6: Co-reliance on Resources by Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals Compared with Two Benchmarks
SC Reliance on Resource
Co-reliance on Resource
CA
No CA
Difference Random Actual Difference
Relies Reliance
Ordinary
Meaning
Dictionaries
Language
Canons
Legislative
History
Legislative
Purpose
Agency
Deference

65.7

44.3

21.4

47.7

51.4

3.7

26.1

7.7

18.4

0.6

1.9

1.3

44.2

16.4

27.8

5.5

10.6

5.1

54.9

25.5

29.4

12.6

19.3

6.7

78.6

70.1

8.5

35.6

37.7

2.1

32.0

12.6

19.4

4.0

7.5

3.5

The second is that there is still considerable divergence between the two
levels in individual cases. To take two examples, even though dictionaries
and agency deference would seem considerably more relevant to some cases
than to others, the Supreme Court still relied on those resources less than onethird of the time when a court of appeals chose to use them. Even for the
language canons, where we might expect a high level of agreement on their
relevance, the Supreme Court relied on that resource less than half the time
when the court of appeals had done so. Legislative purpose is the only
resource that the Court relied on more than two-thirds of the time when the
court of appeals had also relied on it, and that figure is not meaningful
because the Court’s rate of reliance was nearly as high when the court of
appeals had not relied on legislative purpose.
By both of our two measures, co-reliance was highest for legislative
history, followed by language canons, ordinary meaning, and agency
deference. Legislative purpose and dictionaries each ranked last by one
measure and next to last by the other.
It may be that language canons and legislative history are especially casespecific in their relevance, so that judges and justices would have some
inclination to rely on them in the same cases even if neither level of court
influenced the other. There are many well-articulated language canons, and
their taxonomy has become increasingly visible;128 this facilitates selecting
them for application on a case-by-case basis. Legislative history is casespecific for a different reason. Particular legislative record sources are linked
to different stages of the lawmaking process; judges and justices seeking

128. For detailed categorizations, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 41, at 56–339 and
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 18, at 1195–1215.
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guidance on legislative intent may view the same or different stages of the
process as relevant or controlling in a given case.129
In contrast, dictionaries and legislative purpose seem more discretionary—
resources that could be employed or eschewed in any case. Judges seeking
clarification on the ordinary meaning of a statutory term may choose to
consult a dictionary, but they may instead seek guidance from their own
instincts or common sense, or else turn to definitions appearing in the statute.
And references to a generalized legislative policy motivation may be
sufficiently subjective or indefinite to be invoked on a more random basis by
judges.
Co-reliance may also differ between cases in which the Supreme Court
affirms the court of appeals decision that it reviews and cases in which the
Court vacates or reverses.130 The most obvious basis for such a difference is
that the choice of resources may affect the outcome that a court reaches. If a
court of appeals relies on legislative history to reach its decision and the
Supreme Court rejects the relevance of legislative history, that divergence
may lead the Court to reach a different judgment and thus to a reversal of the
court of appeals. Alternatively, when the Court has voted to reverse the court
of appeals, the justice who writes the Court’s opinion may justify that
reversal by employing a set of resources different from those on which the
lower court relied.131
One test of this hypothesis is based on the simple number of agreements
between the two courts about reliance on the six resources; if either both
courts or neither rely on a particular resource, that is counted as an agreement.
Thus this measure can range from 0 to 6. Altogether, the mean number of
agreements was 4.32 for cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeals and 4.13 when it reversed or vacated that decision. Thus,
disposition and agreement were related in the expected direction, and the
difference is probably sufficient in magnitude to be meaningful, but it is not
dramatic.
We can look more closely at this relationship by examining specific
resources. Table 7 shows the relationship between reliance on each resource
by the Supreme Court and reliance or nonreliance by the court of appeals in
the same case for affirmances versus reversals by the Court. The figures

129. See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch
Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1226–27 (2010); see also VICTORIA NOURSE,
MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 66 (2016) (emphasizing the importance of
relying on the legislative history source that is most proximate to Congress’s decision about
the insertion or meaning of the contested textual provision).
130. We use the term “reverse” to refer to decisions in which the Court reverses or vacates
the court of appeals decision.
131. Like the Court’s decisions as a whole, our cases are dominated by reversals. Three
cases were omitted from analysis of affirmances and reversals because the Court consolidated
cases and its decision reversed one court of appeals and affirmed another. Of the 318
remaining cases, 208 (65.4 percent) were reversals.
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shown are the increases in percentage points when the court of appeals relied
on a resource—the same measure as the “difference” column in Table 6.132
Table 7: Increase in Reliance on Resources in Supreme Court When Court
of Appeals Relies on Resource133
Affirming (%)
Ordinary Meaning
Dictionaries
Language Canons
Legislative History
Legislative Purpose
Agency Deference
Mean134

19.1
49.4
34.1
32.1
8.6
42.5
31.0

Vacating or
Reversing (%)
23.1
4.7
23.6
26.6
6.7
2.9
14.6

Our hypothesis predicts that the difference will be greater for cases in
which the Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals. The mean statistical
effect of courts of appeals’ use on Supreme Court reliance on the six
resources is more than twice as great for affirmances. The relationship is in
the expected direction for five of the six resources, all but ordinary meaning.
It is quite small for legislative purpose, moderate in magnitude for language
canons and legislative history, and quite large for dictionaries and agency
deference. The results for dictionaries can be discounted heavily because
there were only six cases in which both courts relied on that source; the
results are driven heavily by the fact that four of those six cases involved
affirmances. Because there were twenty-three cases in which both courts
relied on agency deference, the results for that resource are more meaningful
but still should be read with some caution.135
Our findings on this hypothesis are mixed. There is enough evidence to
indicate that agreement about reliance on certain interpretive resources is
132. The analysis might be “flipped,” so that the question is how much resource use in the
court of appeals increases when the Supreme Court uses the resource. The patterns for some
specific resources change: the differences between cases with affirmance and reversal
virtually disappear for ordinary meaning and language canons, and a difference appears for
legislative purpose (7.9 percent for reversal cases and 14.4 percent for affirmance cases). But
the mean differences are quite similar to those in Table 7: 14.3 percent for reversal and 28.9
percent for affirmance.
133. The meaning of the entries in the table can be illustrated with the cell for affirming
and ordinary meaning. In cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, the
percentage of cases in which the Supreme Court relied on ordinary meaning was 19.1
percentage points higher when the court of appeals relied on ordinary meaning.
134. These means give equal weight to the percentages for the six resources. If those
percentages are weighted by the numbers of court of appeals opinions that use each resource,
the percentages become 24.1 percent for affirmances and 17.5 percent for reversals. The
increased percentage for reversals and the decrease for affirmances primarily reflect the small
numbers of court of appeals opinions with dictionary use.
135. Fifteen of the twenty-three cases with co-reliance on agency deference involved
affirmances.
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correlated with agreement on the outcome of cases, but overall the
relationship between the two types of agreement is moderate at most.
Another aspect of co-reliance to consider is change over time. As we
showed earlier in this section, the frequency with which the federal appellate
courts relied on five of our six resources (all but agency deference) increased
or decreased to meaningful degrees between the Burger Court and the
Roberts Court, and these changes were especially dramatic in the Supreme
Court. With these changes, it is possible that patterns of co-reliance changed
as well.
One possibility is that co-reliance became more common because the
Supreme Court communicated its preferences about interpretive resources
more clearly to the lower courts over time. In the Burger Court era, justices
did not express strong preferences on or off the Court, so court of appeals
judges had little guidance from the Court about what resources were
appropriate to use. From the onset of the Rehnquist Court, individual justices
increasingly articulated their preferences. In turn, the growing support for
textualism was reflected in the Court’s increased reliance on resources
associated with textualism and declining reliance on resources disfavored by
that school of thought. With that guidance, court of appeals judges might
have had greater interest and capacity for following the Court’s lead than
they did in the Burger Court era.
Yet the changes in reliance on resources by the Supreme Court might have
led to changes in co-reliance that went in the opposite direction. Our earlier
study of dictionary and legislative history use indicated that in the Roberts
Court era, the courts of appeals take a more pragmatic approach to reliance
on interpretive resources than does the Supreme Court.136 If the Supreme
Court moved toward a more dogmatic approach over time while the lower
courts maintained their pragmatism, then there may have developed a greater
divergence in reliance on resources over time.
We tested these competing hypotheses in the same ways that we tested the
hypothesis about co-reliance. We began by looking at the level of agreement
about reliance on the six resources. By this measure, agreement declined
considerably, from a mean of 4.45 in the Burger Court to 4.14 in the
Rehnquist Court and 4.00 in the Roberts Court. But this decline is partly a
product of dictionary reliance—or, more accurately, nonreliance—in the
Burger Court. Because only one opinion at either level relied on dictionaries
during that period,137 a very high rate of agreement on dictionary reliance
was guaranteed, so we did not calculate an increase in reliance on dictionaries
in the Burger Court when the court of appeals relied on dictionaries.
If we compare the mean for the other five resources, omitting dictionaries,
the decline is less substantial though still meaningful: from 3.46 to 3.24 to
3.28. We should not dismiss the decline across all six resources because the
agreement of the two levels of courts about nonreliance on dictionaries in the

136. See generally Protean Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2.
137. That was a court of appeals decision.
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Burger Court is significant in itself, even though the results for the other five
resources indicate a less dramatic decline. Moreover, it is of interest that by
both of these two measures, most if not all of the decline occurred from the
Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court. This was the period when some justices
began to take a more doctrinaire approach to reliance on particular kinds of
resources.
Table 8 shows the relationship between time and co-reliance for individual
resources.138 The means for the resources139 show that there was an overall
decline in co-reliance on these resources. Like the mean numbers of
agreements, the means for these relationships indicate that most of the
decline occurred between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
Table 8: Increase in Reliance on Resource in Supreme Court When Court
of Appeals Relies on Resource, by Chief Justice Era

Ordinary Meaning
Dictionaries140
Language Canons
Legislative History
Legislative Purpose
Agency Deference
Mean141
Mean (Without Dictionaries)

Burger
(%)
41.1
—
20.6
27.3
2.3
32.6
24.8
24.8

Rehnquist
(%)
14.4
27.0
18.9
32.5
9.2
10.5
18.7
17.1

Roberts
(%)
-8.0
5.9
35.1
24.2
7.1
12.7
12.8
14.2

As the table shows, the temporal patterns were quite different across the
resources. Co-reliance actually increased substantially for language canons
during the Roberts years and to a small extent for legislative purpose in the
138. As we did for the analysis of Supreme Court disposition, supra note 131, we “flipped”
the analysis so that the question is how much resource use in the courts of appeals increases
when the Supreme Court uses the resource. None of the basic patterns for individual resources
changed, and the patterns for the means were quite similar. For all six resources, the mean
difference in court of appeals reliance on a resource between cases with Supreme Court
reliance or nonreliance on that resource was 27.6 percent in the Burger Court, 16.6 percent in
the Rehnquist Court, and 14.1 percent in the Roberts Court. If dictionary use is omitted, the
means are 27.6 percent, 15.8 percent, and 16.0 percent, respectively.
139. Because the data for dictionary use in the Burger Court are not meaningful, we
computed a mean for all six resources (with dictionaries included in the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts) and a mean for the five resources other than dictionaries.
140. Differences were not computed for dictionaries in the Burger Court because of the
near-absence of dictionary use in that period.
141. If weighted means are used, see supra note 134, the percentages for the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts are close to those for the unweighted means. But the percentages for the
Roberts Court decline moderately (from 12.8 percent to 8.6 percent for all six resources and
from 14.2 percent to 8.8 percent when dictionaries are excluded). Those declines reflect the
negative difference for plain meaning, the most frequently used resource in the courts of
appeals.
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Rehnquist era. It increased and then returned to its earlier level for legislative
history, so that co-reliance in the Roberts Court was slightly lower than in
the Burger Court. The substantial increase for language canons may reflect
at least in part a more robust embrace of these canons by appeals courts
following the expanded Supreme Court reliance that began during the
Rehnquist years.142
On the other hand, there was a large decline in co-reliance for agency
deference in the Rehnquist years and a considerable decline in dictionary coreliance for the Roberts period. Further, we found a massive decline for
ordinary meaning in both the Rehnquist and Roberts eras, to the point that
the Roberts Court was less likely to rely on ordinary meaning in cases in
which the court of appeals relied on it.
The means at the bottom of the table show that for the six resources as a
whole, co-reliance declined considerably between the Burger and Rehnquist
eras. The patterns for individual resources are complicated. For language
canons, one of the three resources associated with a textualist approach,
growing reliance on this resource at both court levels in the Roberts Court
was accompanied by growing agreement on when to rely on it. For the other
two textualist-identified resources, just the opposite occurred: increased
reliance on ordinary meaning and dictionaries occurred at the same time as
agreement on their reliance in individual cases declined.
Among the three resources associated with a purposivist approach,
agreement about when to rely on legislative history and legislative purpose
remained stable even as the overall reliance on those resources declined.143
That stability of agreement about legislative history is especially striking in
light of the growing disagreement over the legitimacy of using this resource
at all. In contrast, agreement on when to rely on agency deference dropped
considerably even though there was stability in the frequency with which this
resource was relied on.
This mixed set of temporal patterns does not lend itself to simple
conclusions. However, the overall decline in co-reliance on resources
suggests that the increasingly doctrinaire approach of some Supreme Court
justices to choices of interpretive resources has worked against agreement
about which resources to rely on in particular cases.
Our discussion of co-reliance thus far has been based on categories of
resources. But when two courts both draw from the same broad category,
such as legislative history, they might be relying on different specific
142. As noted earlier, Roberts-era appeals courts rely on multiple language canons over
half the time when they invoke the canons (compared to less than one-fifth of the time for
Burger- and Rehnquist-era appeals court decisions); they also invoke a considerably wider
range of language canons than their counterparts in those earlier eras. See supra note 113.
143. Co-reliance for agency deference and legislative history occurred most often in the
Burger era, whereas for language canons and dictionaries it occurred most often in the Roberts
era. It is not surprising that for our resources with the two highest levels of co-reliance,
legislative history is front-loaded and language canons are back-loaded. The overall frequency
of reliance for legislative history peaked in the Burger years, whereas overall frequency for
language canons has been greatest during the Roberts period.
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resources within that category—say, House hearings versus a conference
report. For that reason, it is worthwhile to examine the extent to which there
is what we will call a match between the Supreme Court and court of appeals
in the specific resources that they rely on. Three of our six resources are
amenable to analysis of matches of specific resources: legislative history,
language canons, and dictionaries. There were only six cases in which both
courts relied on dictionaries, so quantitative analysis of specific matches does
not tell us much.144
For language canons, we treated the two courts as fully matching if they
relied on the same canon or canons. If they shared at least one canon, but
one court relied on a canon that the other did not, that was a partial match.145
If the two courts had no canons in common, that was treated as a nonmatch.
Of the thirty-four instances of co-reliance, 29 percent were full matches, 32
percent partial matches, and 38 percent nonmatches.
For legislative history, matches were based on sources such as House
committee reports, Senate hearings, and House floor debates.146 Because an
opinion relies on several sources of legislative history more often than it
relies on multiple language canons, our coding rules for matching were more
complicated than they were for canons. We counted a match as full if the
two courts relied on two or more of the same legislative history sources and
those same sources amount to at least half the sources relied on by either one
of the two courts147 or if each court relied on the same single source. A match
was treated as partial if at least one-quarter (but less than one-half) of the
sources relied on by one court were relied on by both, or if one of the two
sources relied on by either court was relied on by both. Nonmatches were
144. We counted co-reliance on dictionaries as a full match if the two courts defined the
same word or words and if their definitions (even if from different dictionaries) were the same
or similar. Partial matches were instances in which the two courts defined the same word but
one court also defined additional words; or if the courts defined the same word or words but
the definitions were quite different. By those criteria, of the six cases, two had full matches,
two partial matches, and two nonmatches.
145. In two instances in which different canons are quite similar, we combined them into a
single category: (a) noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis and (b) variants of the whole act
rule (interpret the same terms in the same way; the presumption of consistent usage; the
presumption of meaningful variation; the presumption against redundancy; and the
presumption against surplusage).
146. Thus a match would occur if both courts relied on the House committee report or on
floor debate from the same chamber. It would be possible to use a criterion for matches that
is even more demanding, counting as a match only situations where the two courts relied on
the same portion of a committee report or the same floor speaker. We concluded that because
the sources invoked by the two judicial levels for a particular law were predictably limited
(e.g., one authorizing committee report per chamber, and floor statements from managers or
leading proponents), our criterion was appropriate. By the same token, we could have counted
as a language canons match only situations where reliance on the same canon (e.g., the rule
against surplusage or noscitur a sociis) addressed the same portion of the text. That seems to
us unduly constraining, inasmuch as different judges invoke these canons to clarify or
elucidate often-distinct portions of a text they regard as ambiguous or inconclusive. Still, in
interpreting the data on matches, our criteria should be kept in mind.
147. In other words, at least 50 percent of the sources relied on by the Supreme Court were
also relied on by the court of appeals, or at least 50 percent of the sources relied on by the
courts of appeals were relied on by the Supreme Court.
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cases in which less than one-quarter of the sources relied on by the Supreme
Court were relied on by the court of appeals and less than one-quarter of the
sources relied on by the court of appeals were relied on by the Supreme
Court. Of the sixty-two instances of co-reliance, 47 percent were full
matches, 31 percent partial matches, and 23 percent nonmatches.
Because specific language canons and sources of legislative history are not
fully comparable with each other, and because our measures of matching
differed between the two, comparisons between the results for the two
resources must be approached with caution. That said, it is worth noting that
the level of full matches is considerably higher for legislative history than for
language canons, and the level of nonmatches is substantially higher for
language canons. To the extent such comparisons are meaningful, the higher
level of nonmatches may reflect the great number of language canons from
which courts may choose (far greater than the sources of legislative history)
as well as the absence of any hierarchy among them.
Finally, the higher proportion of nonmatches for language canons is
accompanied by a considerably higher reversal rate at the Supreme Court (77
percent versus 43 percent for legislative history nonmatch cases).148 The raw
numbers of nonmatch cases are small enough to be treated with some
caution,149 but the results suggest that language canons are susceptible to
being used more strategically by the Supreme Court than legislative history.
Given that language canons populate a large universe with no hierarchy of
authority, justices who wish to reverse the appeals court have ample
discretion in their choice of a different or dueling canon. Legislative history
sources are fewer in number and involve more of a recognized hierarchy; this
may somewhat constrain the options for strategic reliance on a different
specific legislative history resource when deciding to reverse a circuit court
decision.
Stepping back, and again with some caution given that our measures of
matching are new ones, we can say something about the overall levels of
matching. The clearest conclusion is also the most important: co-reliance
on the same interpretive resource frequently masks considerable
disagreement about which canon or which source of legislative history is
relevant to the issues in a case.150 Although the pattern of matches for
dictionaries is less meaningful because of the limited number of cases with

148. Overall, there was no meaningful relationship between the extent of the match and
reversal for legislative history. The reversal rates were 43 percent for nonmatches, 63 percent
for partial matches, and 52 percent for full matches. However, there was a substantial
relationship for language canons: a 77 percent reversal rate for nonmatches, 60 percent for
partial matches, and 44 percent for full matches.
149. There are thirteen language canon nonmatch cases and fourteen legislative history
nonmatch cases in our dataset.
150. Disagreement may also take forms that our measures of matching do not capture. As
we noted earlier, for legislative history, one court might draw from a different passage in the
same source, such as a Senate committee report. See supra note 145. And for both resources,
the two courts may reach opposite conclusions from a particular canon or passage in the
legislative history.
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co-reliance, the pattern for dictionaries reinforces that conclusion.151 Thus,
our findings on matching reinforce our findings on co-reliance by underlining
the differences in the specific resources that the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court rely on when addressing the statutory interpretation issues
that arise in the same case.
D. Overview of Findings
Our set of findings about patterns of use for six interpretive resources is
complex: different findings point in different directions. If we focus on
comparison between the Supreme Court and courts of appeals, perhaps the
best general conclusion is that there is a meaningful but limited similarity in
their choices of resources as bases or support for their judgments.
At the broadest level, the frequency with which the two court levels relied
on four of the six resources—all but legislative purpose and, to a lesser
degree, ordinary meaning—is at the same general level for our study period
as a whole. That pattern holds for each of the three families of labor and
employment statutes that the Court interprets most frequently, with a modest
exception for two resources under ERISA.
This similarity is noteworthy, but its significance should not be overstated.
When two levels of courts decide the same set of cases, it is inevitable that
they will tend to rely on particular resources with similar frequencies.
Moreover, the substantially higher rates with which courts of appeals rely on
ordinary meaning and the Supreme Court relies on legislative purpose
underline the fact that the two levels of courts do not march in lockstep even
in deciding the same set of cases.
More significant are the similarities between the two court levels in
temporal trends between the early and late parts of our study period. Both
levels increasingly relied on the three resources associated with textualism,
although language canons in the courts of appeals followed a more
complicated path over time. And both relied on legislative history and
legislative purpose less frequently between the Burger and Roberts Courts.
Year-level correlations between trends provided additional evidence that the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals moved in the same direction in their
choices of resources, and the correlations were especially strong for
dictionaries and legislative history.
This similarity in trends indicates a systematic element to the increases and
declines that occurred in all six resources, except for agency deference. That
systematic element could stem from similar responses to developments in the
legal world by the courts of appeals and Supreme Court, such as the growing
interest in textualism. Alternatively, or in addition, it could stem from the
Supreme Court’s influence on lower courts, influence that might reflect
different motivations.
Yet the coinciding of trends should not be exaggerated. Importantly,
changes in the frequency with which five of the resources were relied on were
151. See supra note 144.
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generally more substantial in the Supreme Court than in the courts of appeals;
legislative purpose is the one exception among those five resources, and the
decline in reliance on legislative purpose came earlier in the courts of
appeals. Whatever the sources of temporal trends were, they had a distinctly
more limited effect in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court.
Even more noteworthy are our findings with respect to co-reliance on
resources in the same individual cases. The frequency with which both courts
employ a particular resource in a given case is greater than we would expect
if the choice of resources was random. It seems likely that both courts are
responding to attributes of individual cases that make particular resources
appropriate. At the same time, it is quite common for one court to rely on a
particular resource in deciding a case while the other court eschews that
resource in deciding the same case. That is especially true, as we would
expect, for resources that are employed only infrequently: the Supreme
Court relied on dictionaries only one-fourth of the time when the circuit court
had done so. But it is also true for resources invoked more regularly: the
Court relied on language canons less than half the time when the circuit court
had done so, and the ratio for legislative history was only slightly above half.
Moreover, when the two courts do rely on the same resource in their opinions,
our inquiry indicates that the courts frequently employ different versions of
the same resource.
These differences in the choices of interpretive resources by the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals are striking in light of the fact that we are
comparing their responses to the same set of cases. As we have noted,
because the choices of resources by judges and justices are inevitably guided
and constrained by the attributes of the cases they decide, at least a moderate
degree of similarity between court levels in those choices is almost
guaranteed. Further, judges on the two court levels are subject to some of
the same influences from the larger legal world as well as their influence on
each other. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals display
considerable independence in their reliance on resources, both overall and
especially in particular cases.
III. DOCTRINAL ANALYSES: CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY WITHIN
CO-RELIANCE
The most granular aspects of our empirical analysis involve case-specific
reliance on interpretive resources. Our overall findings reported in Table 1
suggest equivalent levels of reliance for two important resources—language
canons and legislative history. But those equivalences give way to more
complicated results when examining matches and nonmatches for cases with
co-reliance. As discussed above, for roughly two-fifths of the cases in which
both courts relied on language canons, the two courts had no canons in
common. The proportion of total nonmatches was lower for legislative
history; still, in over three-fifths of co-reliance cases, the two courts shared
less than half the same legislative history sources.
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Given these surprisingly high levels of divergence in reliance within the
same resource categories between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals, we probe more deeply here into co-reliance cases themselves. To
be sure, there is also considerable divergence in reliance involving judicial
selection of resource categories. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court
relied on language canons less than half the time when the appeals court had
done so, and the proportion was only slightly above half with respect to
legislative history.152 Still, examining divergence within resource categories
allows us to explore the possible motivations behind divergence in stronger
terms.
In our effort to analyze co-reliance cases, we begin with definitions of
certain key terms. We distinguish between what we call consistent and
inconsistent uses of the same resource. Consistent usage occurs when the
appeals court and the Supreme Court essentially rely on the same version of
the same resource—a similar or identical definition of the same word in one
or more dictionaries; the same language canon (including a recognized
variation); or the same source(s) of legislative history.153 Consistent usage
generally arises in cases of full match between the two courts, though it also
may occur in cases of partial match.154
Inconsistent usage occurs when the two judicial levels rely on different
specific versions of the same resource. Thus, a circuit court may regard the
dictionary definition of one textual term as pivotal while the Supreme Court
regards a substantially different definition of the same term, or the definition
of a different term, as probative; or the circuit court may rely on House and
Senate committee reports while the Supreme Court invokes floor debates and
the conference report. Inconsistent usage usually arises in cases of nonmatch
or partial match between the two courts.

152. See supra Table 6 and accompanying text. The Court relied on dictionaries only onefourth of the time when the circuit court had done so. See supra Table 6 and accompanying
text. There are an ample number of specific cases that could serve as illustrative of these
findings. In addition to the cases discussed at supra note 27, see, for example, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (relying inter alia on dictionaries and legislative
history to hold in favor of a class of female employees), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (relying
inter alia on ordinary meaning and language canons while rejecting reliance on legislative
history and saying nothing about dictionaries); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co. (In re Howard Delivery Serv., Inc.), 403 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2005) (relying inter alia on
ordinary meaning, language canons, and dictionaries to hold against an employer’s workers’
compensation insurance carrier in a bankruptcy case), rev’d, 547 U.S. 651 (2006) (relying
inter alia on legislative history and purpose while eschewing reliance on ordinary meaning
and language canons and saying nothing about dictionaries).
153. By “same source” of legislative history, we referred to the same general source (such
as a Senate report or a House hearing) in our earlier empirical analysis of matches, partial
matches, and nonmatches. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. In our closer
examination of individual cases, we consider this consistency of general sources but also
review the particular contents of those sources. See, e.g., infra notes 220–23 and
accompanying text (discussing Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 86 (1973)).
154. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text for description of full matches, partial
matches, and nonmatches when relying on the same resource category.
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We also distinguish within inconsistent usages between what we call direct
and indirect inconsistency. A direct inconsistent usage appears more
conscious and strategic: the Supreme Court has chosen to rely on a different
version of the resource (a different definition, canon, or piece of legislative
history) that it construes to be in direct tension or conflict with the version
invoked by the appeals court, sometimes over the objection of a dissenting
justice. For instance, an appeals court might apply the canon of meaningful
variation to derive different meanings from two otherwise parallel
provisions, while the Supreme Court might view the two provisions as
similar in meaning or identical in scope based on the in pari materia canon.
An indirect inconsistent usage—rare compared to direct inconsistency—
appears almost inadvertent: the Supreme Court’s pursuit of the different
version (again a different word, canon, or piece of legislative history)
addresses a separate aspect of the issues at stake, perhaps a distinct legal
question or subquestion in the case. Again, to use a hypothetical example,
an appeals court might rely on a conference report discussion linked to
enactment of a particular provision while the Supreme Court relies on a
Senate report accompanying a separate provision in the same statute that
addresses a distinct legal question. This triadic approach—consistency,
direct inconsistency, indirect inconsistency—may be fuzzy or contestable at
the margins, but we believe it reflects certain important differences in
approach, the scope and meaning of which are illustrated when applied to
specific cases.
With that background, we focus on co-reliance in the three categories for
which we analyzed matches and nonmatches: dictionaries, language canons,
and legislative history. We identify cases where the specific version of the
resource relied upon is consistent between the two judicial levels and cases
where it is inconsistent. For the latter cases, we regard most inconsistent
approaches as direct and strategic though at least one is indirect.
A. Dictionary Co-reliance
Cases in which both the circuit court and Supreme Court rely on dictionary
definitions are comparatively rare: only six appear in our dataset.155 Four of
the six are from the Roberts era, for which we included every labor and
employment case decided by both judicial levels.156 The two other
dictionary co-reliance cases arose in the Rehnquist era, for which we sampled

155. When we refer to numbers and proportions of cases in various categories in this
section, it should be kept in mind that we are referring to cases in the dataset; as we have
discussed, the cases for the Burger and Rehnquist Courts represent a one-third sample of all
eligible cases during those periods. Because the dataset includes similar numbers of cases
from the three periods, numbers of cases with co-reliance are fairly comparable across periods.
156. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018), rev’g 845 F.3d 925 (9th
Cir. 2017); NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017), aff’g 796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011), aff’g sub nom. Chicanos Por La
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011), vacating 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009).
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every third decision.157 It is hardly surprising that no dictionary co-reliance
cases arose in the Burger era, given that dictionary reliance was then virtually
nonexistent at both judicial levels.158
For the Roberts and Rehnquist eras, the low number of co-reliance cases
reflects the presence of a high number of nonmatches. The four Roberts
Court co-reliance cases contrast with a total of twenty-two dictionary reliance
cases in the Supreme Court and sixteen reliance cases in the circuit courts.
Similarly, the two Rehnquist co-reliance cases represent a small fraction of
the instances of dictionary reliance at either judicial level.159 We briefly
describe two of the four Roberts-era decisions here, as well as one of two
from the Rehnquist Court. We focus only on the dictionary definition issues,
although both courts invoked various other resources in each of the three
cases.
In Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC,160 the Ninth Circuit had to construe
an exception to overtime compensation requirements under the FLSA;
specifically, whether service advisors in an automobile dealership were
covered by the exemption for “salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily
engaged in selling or servicing automobiles.”161 The Ninth Circuit panel,
noting that these advisors were clearly not salesmen engaged in the selling of
automobiles, determined that the key textual terms from an ordinary meaning
standpoint were “primarily,” “engaged,” and “servicing.”162 Relying on
definitions from four dictionaries in general use,163 the court held that service
advisors were not “chiefly” or “principally” “occup[ied]” or “involved” in
the “supply[,] maintenance[, or] . . . repair of automobiles”; rather, they were
employed to wait on customers and arrange for mechanics to do the servicing
work, and therefore were subject to the FLSA overtime requirements.164
The Supreme Court reversed.165 Ignoring the terms “primarily” and
“engaged in,” the majority relied on definitions of “salesman” and
“servicing” in two of the four general use dictionaries invoked by the court
157. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), aff’g 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir.
1997); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), aff’g sub nom. Brock v.
Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1986).
158. There were no dictionary reliance cases among the 116 Supreme Court decisions for
the Burger era and only one such case among the circuit court decisions for the same era.
159. The two cases contrast with eight Supreme Court decisions in our Rehnquist Court
dataset that relied on dictionaries and six circuit court decisions relying on dictionary
definitions.
160. 845 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) (2012).
162. See Navarro, 845 F.3d at 931.
163. See id. (relying on the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (“Random
House”), Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (“Webster’s Third ”), Oxford English
Dictionary (“OED”), and the American Heritage Dictionary).
164. See id. The court considered the company’s dictionary-related argument that, in broad
terms, the service advisors were “involved” in “supplying maintenance and repair,” but found
that this stretched the ordinary meaning too far; the court observed that “[w]e usually do not
say that we primarily engage in an activity that we do not perform personally (and that we
may lack the skills to perform).” Id.
165. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018).
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of appeals.166 The majority concluded that because a “salesman” is someone
who sells goods or services, a service advisor is plainly a salesman. Further,
“servicing” can mean either maintaining or repairing a motor vehicle, or
providing a service, and these advisors are “integral to the servicing
process”—they meet and listen to customers, suggest repair and maintenance
services, and explain the work done when customers return to collect their
vehicles.167 A Supreme Court dissent emphasized one of the Ninth Circuit’s
dictionary arguments: that the ordinary meaning of “servicing” is the action
of repairing or maintaining a vehicle, not just being “integral to the servicing
process.”168
We view this as an example of inconsistent co-reliance that is direct. The
Supreme Court majority chose to define a word in the FLSA text
(“salesman”) that the Ninth Circuit panel had viewed as inapplicable. The
Court also ignored two words in that text (“primarily” and “engaged”) that
the Ninth Circuit had regarded as central. Further, although the two courts
employed the same dictionary definitions for one key term (“servicing”),
they emphasized different aspects of those definitions. Strategic thinking as
part of Supreme Court review need not have a particular ideological
orientation. While the Court in Encino Motorcars pursued such an approach
to dictionary definitions as part of reversing a pro-employee decision below,
another Roberts Court case of direct inconsistent co-reliance involved
broadening the dictionaries consulted as part of vacating a pro-employer
decision by the court of appeals.169
In our final Roberts Court example, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,170
the Court reviewed a Ninth Circuit decision that construed the savings clause
of the preemption provision in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA).171 An Arizona law, aimed at employers who hire undocumented
immigrants, included as its main sanction the revocation of state licenses to
do business in Arizona.172 The federal statute expressly preempts state laws
imposing civil or criminal sanctions “other than through licensing and similar
laws.”173 The circuit court relied on the Black’s Law definition of “licensing”
and “licenses” as “a permission, usually revocable, to commit some act that
would otherwise be unlawful,” and held that the Arizona law—providing for
166. See id. at 1140 (relying on OED and Random House). Compare supra note 163.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1144–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7–8, 14 (2011)
(The majority concluded that additional dictionary definitions of “filed” make the definition
more ambiguous than the appeals court allowed for and that a “complaint” need not be “filed”
in writing to trigger the antiretaliation protections of the FLSA.).
170. 563 U.S. 582 (2011). The Ninth Circuit decision is titled Chicanos Por La Causa,
Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011). The cases involved other issues besides the express preemption
question for which dictionary definitions were invoked. We do not address those issues here.
171. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) (2012).
172. See Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 862 (describing the provisions of the Legal Arizona
Workers Act, which was enacted in 2007).
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2).
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the suspension of employers’ licenses to do business in the state—fell
squarely within the IRCA savings clause.174 The Supreme Court affirmed
on the express preemption issue. The Court relied on a Webster’s Third
definition of “licensing” that was identical in relevant respects to the Black’s
Law definition invoked by the Ninth Circuit.175 Like the court below, the
majority found this definition dispositive.
We view this as an example of consistent co-reliance. Although the two
courts invoked different dictionaries to define the same key word, the
definitional language they consulted was virtually identical. And the two
courts applied these definitions in the same contextual manner to reach the
same conclusion. The Supreme Court went on to reject additional arguments
raised by the dissent that its dictionary definition was overbroad or left key
issues unaddressed, but an extra dimension of contestation in a Supreme
Court decision is not unusual. What is salient for our purposes is that the
majority focused on defining the same word as the appeals court, and in doing
so it applied an identical definitional concept.
Finally, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,176 the issue was whether, under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990177 (ADA), corrective and
mitigating measures (such as eyeglasses in this instance) should be
considered when determining if an individual is disabled, thereby restricting
the Act’s potential scope of coverage. The ADA defines someone with a
“disability” as an individual with “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities” or an individual
“regarded as having such an impairment.”178 The Tenth Circuit analyzed the
word “impairment” by referencing three dictionaries (one general and two
legal) and applying the consensus dictionary meaning (to make worse,
weaken, diminish) to the plaintiffs’ uncorrected vision deficiencies; the court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ vision is a physical impairment under the
ADA.179 The court went on to hold, however, that this impairment did not
substantially limit the plaintiffs’ major life activity of seeing, because an
assessment of “substantially limits” must take into consideration mitigating
or corrective measures such as eyeglasses. The court reached this conclusion
largely through reliance on the analyses of other lower courts, without
invoking any dictionary definitions.180
In affirming the lower court decision, the Supreme Court relied on
definitions of “substantially” in two general dictionaries to hold that
174. See Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 865.
175. See Whiting, 563 U.S. at 595 (reciting the Webster’s Third definition of a license as
“a right or permission granted in accordance with law . . . to engage in some business or
occupation . . . which but for such license would be unlawful”).
176. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). The Tenth Circuit decision is Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
177. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
179. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 898–900 (relying on Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, and Ballentine’s Law Dictionary).
180. Id. at 900–03.
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“substantially limits” in this context means the plaintiffs should have alleged
they were unable to work in a broad class of jobs.181 The Court then applied
those definitions to a second legal question in the case: whether the
defendant airline regarded the plaintiffs’ impairment as substantially limiting
their ability to work. Even assuming that working is a major life activity, the
plaintiffs’ allegation was simply that the airline employer had found the
plaintiffs’ poor vision precluded them from holding positions as global
airline pilots. The Court held that being denied access to a single pilot-related
job did not amount to a substantially limiting impairment.182
We view this as an example of inconsistent co-reliance that is indirect, and
seemingly almost inadvertent. The two courts each relied on dictionaries,
but in doing so they defined two different words. They used five separate
and nonoverlapping dictionaries to address two distinct elements of what
constitutes a disability under the ADA. Further, the words they defined
(“impairment” and “substantially”) were then applied to two separate legal
questions in the case. The Supreme Court did not rely on dictionaries to
address the first prong of the ADA’s core concept—whether an individual
has a substantially limiting impairment that amounts to a disability. And the
Tenth Circuit did not invoke dictionaries to address the “regarded as having
an impairment” prong of the statute’s approach to disability.
In reviewing four of the six dictionary co-reliance cases that appear in our
dataset,183 we identified three distinct forms of consistency or inconsistency.
This diversity of case-specific applications illustrates how even presumptive
uniformity of reliance on a particular interpretive resource can conceal
various divisions and disagreements. Further, three of our four specific cases
involved some form of inconsistent co-reliance. That is not terribly
surprising given the scope for judicial discretion that results from the wide
range of potentially relevant words to define in a given statutory text as well
as the range of available dictionaries and definitions to choose from.184
B. Language Canons Co-reliance
There are thirty-four cases in which both the circuit court and the Supreme
Court rely on language canons. In addition to the far larger number of coreliance cases compared to dictionaries, the frequency of cases in which only
one of the two courts relied on language canons is proportionately less,
especially in the Roberts period when co-reliance cases constitute more than
half of total instances of reliance by the Supreme Court and more than half
at the appeals court level.185 As with dictionaries, over half of the co-reliance
181. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (relying on Webster’s Third and OED).
182. Id. at 492–93.
183. In addition to the three cases addressed in text, we summarized a fourth case. See
supra note 169 and accompanying text.
184. See Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 527–39 (reporting on the Supreme Court’s use
of dictionaries as highly subjective and idiosyncratic).
185. For the Roberts years, there are twenty-one co-reliance cases compared to thirty-seven
total language canon reliance cases in the Supreme Court (57 percent) and thirty-six in the
appeals court (58 percent). For the Burger years, the percentages are also relatively high,
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cases (twenty-one of thirty-four) occurred in the Roberts era—although
unlike dictionaries, there also were ample instances of co-reliance in the
Burger era. We describe four co-reliance cases here: one each from the
Burger and Rehnquist periods and two from the Roberts years. Again, we
are interested only in co-reliance on language canons; while both courts
regularly invoked other resources as well, our focus here is on which
language canons are invoked and in what ways.
In Morton v. Delta Mining, Inc.,186 the issue was whether the Federal Coal
Mine Safety and Health Act authorizes the secretary of the interior to assess
civil penalties against mine operators without making factual findings. The
relevant section of the Act provides as follows:
A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after the person
charged with a violation . . . has been given an opportunity for a public
hearing, and the Secretary has determined, by decision incorporating his
findings of fact therein, that a violation did occur . . . . Any hearing under
this section shall be of record and shall be subject to section 554 of [the
Administrative Procedure Act].187

The secretary assessed a civil penalty without making findings of fact, and
the mining companies appealed. The Third Circuit held against the secretary,
relying in part on two language canons. The court first relied on the rule
against surplusage. Because the section provides that any hearing is subject
to section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which itself
requires factual findings, the requirement of findings in the first sentence
would be redundant if it did not refer to a situation other than one in which a
hearing was requested and held.188 The Third Circuit also invoked the rule
of the last antecedent. The secretary contended that “therein” in the section
referred to the hearing, hence when there was no hearing, there could be no
“findings of fact therein.” The court rebuffed this contention, concluding
that “[s]ince the word ‘decision’ follows ‘hearing’ in the statute, the most
natural and probable referent of ‘therein’ is ‘decision,’ not ‘hearing.’”189

especially for the Supreme Court: eight instances of co-reliance among fifteen total Supreme
Court instances of reliance (53 percent) and eight of twenty-eight in the circuit courts (29
percent). During the Rehnquist period, co-reliance percentages are lower: five co-reliance
cases out of twenty-two Supreme Court instances of reliance (23 percent) and five of thirteen
total circuit court reliance cases (38 percent). For the entire dataset, instances of language
canon co-reliance are 46 percent of all cases with Supreme Court reliance and 44 percent of
all cases with appeals court reliance. It should be noted that, all else being equal, co-reliance
will be more frequent in these proportionate terms when a resource is relied on more
frequently—as is true of language canons in comparison with dictionaries.
186. 495 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1974), rev’d sub. nom. Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc., 423 U.S.
403 (1976). The case, selected through our sampling process, was argued and decided on the
same day as a case reviewing the same issue from the D.C. Circuit. See Nat’l Indep. Coal
Operators Ass’n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388 (1976). The Court’s reasoning is set forth in the
companion case heading and we refer to those pages here.
187. Delta Mining, 495 F.2d at 40 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(3) (1970) (emphasis
added)).
188. Id. at 42.
189. Id. at 42 n.20.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that unless the mine operator had
requested a hearing, such a hearing was not required before the secretary
made factual findings and assessed a penalty. Like the appeals court, the
Supreme Court relied on the rule against surplusage. But it focused more
narrowly on the word “opportunity” rather than the relationship between
APA requirements and the provision’s first sentence. Emphasizing that the
section provides mine operators with no more than an “opportunity” for a
hearing, the Court concluded that “[t]he word “opportunity” would be
meaningless if the statute contemplated [formal] factual findings whether or
not a . . . hearing [was] held.”190 The Court did not refer to the lastantecedent argument invoked by the circuit court.
We regard this as inconsistent usage that is direct and seemingly strategic.
Although the two courts relied on the same canon, the rule against
surplusage, they focused on surplusage in distinct parts of the contested
textual provision. The Supreme Court also acted strategically in not
addressing either of the language canon positions adopted by the appeals
court.
In our Rehnquist-era case, American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB,191 the
petitioner challenged the NLRB’s exercise of its notice and comment
rulemaking power under section 6 of the NLRA. Petitioner’s argument was
that the duly promulgated rule—establishing eight presumptive employee
bargaining units for acute care hospitals—was unlawful because a different
section of the Act, section 9(b), requires the Board to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit “in each case,” meaning on a case-by-case
basis.192 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, relying in part on the
whole act rule. The appeals court noted that the two sections (6 and 9(b))
were enacted at the same time, that Congress was explicit in granting the
Board untrammeled rulemaking power in section 6, and that “it is
probable . . . that Congress would have made an explicit exception for unit
determination” had it meant to place that determination beyond the scope of
the Board’s rulemaking powers.193
The Supreme Court affirmed.194 In doing so, it relied on the same whole
act analysis. As stated by the Court, “[a]s a matter of statutory drafting, if
Congress had intended to curtail in a particular area the broad rulemaking
authority granted in section 6, we would have expected it to do so in language
expressly describing an exception from that section or at least referring
specifically to the section.”195
190. Delta Mining, 423 U.S. at 398.
191. 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
192. Id. at 655.
193. Id. at 656.
194. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991).
195. Id. at 613. It is perhaps worth noting, although neither court did so here, that the
NLRA is replete with express provisos and qualifiers in other sections. See, e.g., National
Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (defining bad faith bargaining,
“subject to the provisions of section 9(a)”); id. § 8(b)(4) (defining unlawful secondary
picketing subject to three separate provisos).
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We view this as an example of consistent usage. The two courts relied on
the same canon, applying it in the same manner to conclude that they could
integrate the same two textual provisions.
Our first Roberts-era case is Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. White,196 construing the antiretaliation language of Title VII. The
language of the basic prohibition in Title VII, section 703(a), bars
discrimination (based on race, sex, etc.) with respect to compensation or
terms or conditions of employment; by contrast, the antiretaliation provision,
section 704(a), bars “discriminat[ion] against” an employee as retaliation (for
filing a charge, testifying, etc.) without referring to compensation or terms
and conditions of employment.197 The Sixth Circuit construed the
antiretaliation language as covering only employee-adverse action related to
the terms or conditions of employment. In doing so, it relied on the whole
act rule, reasoning that because the text in both sections uses the same key
phrase, “discriminate against,” having a different standard for the two
provisions “would be burdensome and unjustified by the text” given the
presumption that Congress intends the phrase to have the same basic meaning
throughout the statute.198 The appeals court went on to uphold the jury
verdict that the plaintiff’s retaliatory reassignment and suspension qualified
as adverse actions related to her terms and conditions of employment.199
The Supreme Court affirmed but applied a different language canon
analysis to the relevant text. The Court began by noting the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis, supported here by the solicitor general, urging that the
“antiretaliation provision should be read in pari materia with the
antidiscrimination provision.”200 But the Court emphasized that “the
language of [section 703(a)] differs from that of the antiretaliation provision
in important ways,” specifically the absence in section 704(a) of words
limiting “discrimination” by relating it to terms and conditions of
employment.201 The Court instead invoked its version of expressio unius or
meaningful variation, stating: “We normally presume that, where words
differ as they differ here, ‘Congress acts intentionally . . . in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.’”202 Having determined that the jury was not required
to find that the employer’s challenged actions were related to the terms or
conditions of employment, the Court went on to affirm the jury verdict
because its findings that the employer’s actions were “materially adverse”
were adequately supported in the record.203

196. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
197. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a) (2012); see also Burlington N., 548 U.S. at
61–62 (discussing the statute); White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795
(same), aff’d, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
198. Burlington N., 364 F.3d at 799–800.
199. Id. at 800–04.
200. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 61.
201. Id. at 61–62.
202. Id. at 62–63 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
203. Id. at 70–73.
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We view this as an instance of inconsistent usage that is direct. The two
judicial levels focus on the same two textual provisions but draw opposite
conclusions by relying on dueling canons. The whole act rule and in pari
materia emphasize harmonization of two not quite identical phrasings,
whereas expressio unius and meaningful variation focus on the differences
and why Congress added them. Although the Supreme Court decision results
in an affirmance, the Court’s canons-based reasoning departs from the
appeals court approach in a manner that appears to be strategic.204
Our final language canons case, also from the Roberts period, is GómezPérez v. Potter.205 The issue was whether the provision of the ADEA
extending protection to federal employees creates a cause of action for
retaliation.206 The First Circuit held that it did not, relying on the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in the Burlington Northern decision along with the canon
of meaningful variation.207 Invoking Burlington Northern, the appeals court
noted that there is a clear substantive difference between causes of action for
discrimination and retaliation.208 The court emphasized that the ADEA
provision governing private employers includes an explicit cause of action
for retaliation while no equivalent provision exists for federal employees; it
concluded that Congress knew how to protect against retaliation but had
acted intentionally to omit that protection here.209 The appeals court went
on to reject an in pari materia argument based on asserted parallels to Title
VII. Although conceding that the ADEA protections for federal employees
were patterned after those for federal employees added earlier to Title VII,
the court pointed out significant differences between the two sets of federal
employee protections that made it inappropriate to borrow here from the Title
VII approach.210
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal employees have a cause
of action for age-based retaliation despite the statute’s silence in this
regard.211 The Court relied in part on prior decisions construing other
antidiscrimination laws,212 but it noted that the employer’s principal
argument was the one relied upon by the First Circuit.213 The Court declined
to invoke the meaningful variation canon because the two relevant provisions
(ADEA provisions covering private and federal employees) were not enacted
204. A concurring opinion from Justice Alito followed the Sixth Circuit position that
section 704(a) should reach only those discriminatory practices covered by 703(a). Id. at 73–
80 (Alito, J., concurring).
205. 476 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
206. Id. at 55–56.
207. Id. at 57–60.
208. Id. at 57–58.
209. Id. at 59.
210. Id. at 59–60 (noting that in Title VII, Congress intended for the federal employee
provision to incorporate provisions applicable to the private sector—including the private
sector antiretaliation provision). By contrast, the ADEA federal employee provision
emphasized that it was self-contained and unaffected by other sections such as those governing
actions against private employers. Id.
211. Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008).
212. Id. at 479–82.
213. Id. at 486.
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simultaneously and contained different language regarding prohibited
practices.214 Instead, the Court invoked the Title VII language prohibiting
federal-sector discrimination, and in particular the broad prohibition in both
statutes of “discrimination” rather than a list of specific prohibited practices
as existed for employees in the private sector.215 This broad ban—evident in
both statutes’ coverage of federal employees—led the Supreme Court to rely
on the parallels to protections for Title VII federal employees, rather than the
protections for ADEA private employees.216 In his dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts invoked the Court’s reasoning in Burlington Northern.217 He
acknowledged the majority’s argument that meaningful variation has less
force when the two provisions are not enacted simultaneously but noted that
when the federal ADEA provision was added seven years later in 1974,
Congress was amending the private sector ADEA text at the same time, hence
was very likely “attuned to its own work reflected in the differences between”
the private sector and federal sector provisions.218
Once again, this is an example of direct inconsistent usage. Indeed, the
appeals court invoked the meaningful variation approach that had been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in its recent Burlington Northern decision, a
case also addressing the relationship between antidiscrimination and
antiretaliation provisions. But whereas the Supreme Court in the earlier case
had invoked meaningful variation, it opted to reject that canon here, relying
instead on a version of in pari materia. The Court relied on other resources
as well, and its turnaround doubtless reflects at least in part that language
canons are presumptions, not rules. For our purposes, however, we view the
Supreme Court’s rejection of the meaningful variation canon—relied upon
by the appeals court here and by the Supreme Court itself in a recent similar
case—as an example of strategic inconsistent usage.
As was true with respect to dictionary co-reliance, our canons cases
illustrate the complex judicial choices that underlie seeming agreement on
the probative value of a given interpretive resource. In Delta Mining, the
exact same canon (rule against surplusage) was relied on to justify opposite
results at the two judicial levels. And in Burlington Northern and GómezPérez, duels between canons that are inherently in tension (in pari materia
and meaningful variation) resulted in divergent outcomes, even when the
appeals court in the second case attempted to follow what it viewed as the
Supreme Court’s prior canonical preference in similar circumstances.
Stepping back, language canons are understood to be presumptions that
must at times be reconciled with one another. They arguably are not subject
to as much judicial discretion as the choice of which word(s) to define and
which dictionaries to use. Still, given the absence of an agreed-upon
hierarchy among these canons, there is a wide range of choices courts can
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 487–89.
Id. at 495 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 496–97.
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make, some of which are in tension with one another. Once again, this level
of case-specific discretion tends to discourage uniformity in application of
an interpretive resource that both court levels agree is worthy of reliance.
C. Legislative History Co-reliance
Legislative history reliance involves the highest number of co-reliance
cases—sixty-two across the three periods. Cases with co-reliance constituted
over half the total number of cases for the entire period in which the Supreme
Court relied on legislative history and over half for the appeals courts as
well—and above half for each court level for each of the three periods except
for the Roberts era in the appeals courts.219 In contrast to dictionaries and
language canons, where the majority of cases with co-reliance arise in the
Roberts era, cases with co-reliance in legislative history occur primarily in
the Burger years followed by the Rehnquist period; only one-fifth take place
during the Roberts years.
We summarize four cases here: two from the Burger era and one each
from the Rehnquist and Roberts periods. As was true for dictionaries and
language canons, we focus only on the use of legislative history in these
cases, although both courts also relied on various other resources in each of
the four cases.
In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,220 the issue was whether Title
VII’s prohibition against discrimination based on “national origin” made it
unlawful to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage. The Fifth
Circuit, after finding the ordinary meaning of “national origin” did not
obviously encompass “citizenship,” consulted the legislative history for
reassurance. The court quoted from the floor statement made by the
chairman of the House subcommittee reporting the bill, confirming that
“national origin” meant “the country from which you or your forebears came
from,”221 and held for the employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, also
invoking the legislative history, “though quite meager,”222 as fully
supporting the ordinary meaning of “national origin.” The majority quoted
from the same House floor statement that had been relied on by the appeals
court, and reinforced its reliance with a reference to House committee report
commentary equating the terms “‘national origin’ and ‘ancestry.’”223
We view this as an example of consistent co-reliance. Although the two
courts recognized that there was little directly relevant legislative history,
they invoked the same key House floor statement to reinforce that the
219. For our entire dataset, instances of legislative history co-reliance are 54 percent of all
instances of Supreme Court reliance and 55 percent of all instances of appeals court reliance.
For the Burger era, the reliance proportions are 54 percent (Supreme Court) and 63 percent
(appeals courts). For the Rehnquist era, the proportions are 56 percent (Supreme Court) and
57 percent (appeals courts). For the Roberts era, the proportions are 52 percent (Supreme
Court) and 41 percent (appeals courts).
220. 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
221. Id. at 1333 (quoting the remarks of Representative Roosevelt).
222. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
223. Id. at 89.
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ordinary meaning of “national origin” was exactly, and only, what Congress
intended. That both courts invoked this floor statement to confirm the
persuasive import of ordinary meaning further evidences the consistency of
their approaches. The probative value of legislative history is often as a
confirmatory resource; given that courts typically invoke an amalgam of
interpretive justifications, the role of confirmatory reasoning is both available
and regularly used.224
In our second Burger Court example, Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB,225
the legislative history is more complex. The issue under the NLRA was
whether an employer may refuse to bargain with a union that has obtained
authorization cards from a majority of bargaining unit members. The appeals
court relied in part on the textual provision (section 9(a)) that the employees’
exclusive bargaining representative shall be the union “designated or
selected” by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit;226 it added
that the Supreme Court had previously construed these alternate textual terms
to mean an election was not the only “predicate for a union claim to majority
status,” triggering an employer’s duty to bargain.227 The appeals court then
emphasized the legislative history accompanying efforts to amend section
9(a) in 1947. It observed that the House version of the 1947 text would have
made an employer’s refusal to bargain unlawful only if the union had been
certified through an election.228 The conference report, however, rejected
this version, instead “follow[ing] the provisions of existing law,” which made
it unlawful to refuse to bargain “subject to the provisions of section 9(a).”229
The appeals court concluded from this sequence of drafting history that
Congress clearly contemplated an employer’s duty to recognize the union
even absent an election.230 The appeals court reinforced its reliance by
observing that Congress in 1947 added a new section 9(c)(1), giving
employers the right (and obligation) to file their own representation petition
as a safeguard if they doubted the majority status of a union supported by
authorization cards.231
The Supreme Court reversed.232 In a 5-4 decision, the majority invoked
separate legislative history accompanying section 9(c)(1).233 It viewed this
history (excerpts from the Senate committee report and the Senate sponsor’s
224. See Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV 901
(2011).
225. 419 U.S. 301 (1974), rev’g sub nom. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB,
487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
226. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)), rev’d sub nom. Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB 419 U.S. 301
(1974).
227. Id. (relying on NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969)).
228. Id. at 1106 & n.27 (citing H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. (1947)).
229. Id. at 1106 n.27 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 510, at 41 (1947) (Conf. Rep.)).
230. Id. at 1107.
231. Id. at 1106.
232. Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974).
233. See id. at 307–08.
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floor statement) as aimed not at placing a broad obligation on employers but
rather as allowing employers to petition for an election only in limited
circumstances—when confronted with competing recognition claims by two
or more unions.234 The dissenting justices relied, as had the court of appeals,
on the Act’s drafting history summarized in the conference report.235
This is an example of inconsistent use that we regard as direct. The fact
that the appeals court and Supreme Court discuss wholly separate legislative
history sources, involving distinct textual provisions, could lead to calling
the inconsistent use indirect rather than direct and seemingly strategic. The
circuit court addresses drafting history and failed amendments for section
9(a), drawing strong inferences from the conference report summary of that
history. The Supreme Court relies instead on history accompanying the
addition of a new separate provision in 1947. However, the Court majority
makes no reference at all to the conference report emphasized by the appeals
court and the dissenting justices, suggesting a more deliberate and conscious
decision to avoid that history. Admittedly, the Supreme Court relies on other
resources more than legislative history to support its holding, notably agency
deference.236 What matters for our purposes, however, is that the majority
ignores legislative history that the appeals court (and its own colleagues)
found highly probative, instead invoking separate history for a textual
provision that was ancillary to the dispute as framed by the circuit court.
Our Rehnquist-era example, Smith v. City of Jackson,237 involves whether
the ADEA authorizes recovery in disparate impact cases similarly to Title
VII. The Fifth Circuit held that disparate impact claims may not arise under
the ADEA, pointing in part to an exception in the text that has no Title VII
parallel238 but also relying strongly on ADEA legislative history. The
appeals court invoked the findings and aims of the 1965 congressionally
mandated report by the secretary of labor that gave rise to the ADEA.239 It
emphasized the report’s conclusions that older workers face the problem of
arbitrary age discrimination based on misconceptions about their abilities
(while recognizing that the process of aging affects everyone who lives long
enough), as distinct from racial prejudice that reflects social and economic
factors. Based on its review of the secretary’s report, the court concluded by
contrasting the ADEA’s “refined purpose” with the broad remedial
objectives of Title VII.240
234. Id. (citing to S. REP. NO. 105 (1947) and 93 CONG. REC. 3838 (1947) (remarks of Sen.
Taft)).
235. See id. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 510, at 41 (1947) (Conf.
Rep.)).
236. Id. at 309–10 (majority opinion).
237. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
238. Id. at 190–91 (construing the provision allowing employers to act based on
“reasonable factors other than age” as signifying a barrier against disparate impact claims).
239. Id. at 193–94.
240. Id. The circuit court also relied on the House report accompanying the 1990
amendments to the ADEA, contending that Congress’s insistence on employers producing
age-related statistics for those laid off in certain circumstances was meant “to alert [those]
employees to the possibility that they might have suffered disparate treatment based on age.”
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The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judgment but on different
reasoning: it held that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact recovery
comparable to Title VII, although petitioners had failed to set forth a valid
disparate impact claim in the instant case.241 In holding that disparate impact
claims are permitted under the ADEA, the Supreme Court relied in part on
identical parallel provisions in the two texts.242 But it also invoked “striking
parallel[s]” between the Court’s articulation of its disparate impact theory
under Title VII and the emphasis on obstacles unrelated to job ability or
performance set forth in the secretary of labor’s report commissioned by
Congress.243
We view this as a close case but classify it as consistent usage. The two
judicial levels examine the same legislative history resource to address the
same legal issues. Because they draw different conclusions from this
resource, one could infer inconsistency. However, the secretary of labor’s
report commissioned by Congress is an unusual piece of legislative history—
more akin to a parliamentary white paper244 reflecting an anticipated law’s
underlying purposes than to traditional postintroduction drafting history, or
committee and floor commentary that may shed light on questions of specific
legislative intent. The report is also a central part of the legislative record
that led to drafting and enactment of the ADEA, often referenced by
reviewing courts. While drawing distinct inferences from different
discussions in the report, the two courts regarded this legislative record
document as crucial, and they each sought an underlying relevant purpose
from its contents. The appeals court viewed the report’s focus on
misconceptions about older workers’ abilities as revealing a narrower
purpose than what gave rise to disparate impact liability under Title VII. The
Supreme Court considered the same report’s focus on discrimination

Id. at 193 n.12 (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 664, at 22 (1990)). The Fifth Circuit went on to
reinstate the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims because they had been prematurely
dismissed by the district court. Id. at 196–98.
241. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–43 (2005).
242. The majority invoked identical antidiscrimination language in the two statutes to
support its view that both disparate treatment and disparate impact are covered in each
instance, although the ADEA’s additional “reasonable factors other than age” language
narrowed the scope of disparate impact coverage. Id. at 233–34, 239.
243. Id. at 235 n.5, 238 (identifying the Court’s reasoning in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) with the Wirtz report). Justice Stevens, the majority opinion’s author,
was joined by four justices in the holding that disparate impact applies under the ADEA but
its scope is narrower than under Title VII. Justice Scalia, concurring, relied on agency
deference to justify recognizing disparate impact rather than the text and history analysis set
forth above. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. As explained on the U.K. Parliament’s webpage: “White papers are policy documents
produced by the Government that set out their proposals for future legislation. White Papers
are often published as Command Papers and may include a draft version of a Bill that is being
planned. This provides a basis for further consultation and discussion with interested or
affected groups and allows final changes to be made before a Bill is formally presented to
Parliament.”
White
Papers,
UK
PARLIAMENT,
www.parliament.uk/siteinformation/glossary/white-paper [https://perma.cc/9ARD-AHTR] (last visited Nov. 12,
2019).
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unrelated to animus or job performance as supporting the application of
disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
Our final legislative history example comes from the Roberts Court period.
In Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton,245 the issue was the scope of
ERISA’s exemption of “church plans” from the comprehensive regulation of
employee benefit plans under that statute. The specific question presented
was whether the exemption applies to defined benefit plans that are
established by church-affiliated hospitals rather than the church itself.
The three circuit courts held that a church plan must be established by a
church, or a convention or association of churches, in order to qualify for the
exemption. In addition to relying on the textual definition of a church plan,
the courts invoked legislative history.246 They noted that the purpose behind
the original 1974 definition—exempting plans created and maintained by
churches—was to avoid problems of government entanglement with religion
without unduly expanding the scope of exemptions that might jeopardize the
health of pension plans.247 The definition was expanded in ERISA’s 1980
amendments, and the circuit courts construed the 1980 legislative history to
reflect a clear intent to confer modest new coverage for plans established by
a church but maintained by a church-affiliated pension board while also
consciously eschewing coverage of plans that were established by these
church-affiliated entities.248
The Supreme Court reversed, relying principally on its reading of the 1980
text,249 regarding the 1980 legislative history as generally supportive of its
textual analysis.250 The Supreme Court’s approach to the history began by
discounting its value, noting the Court’s traditional view that excerpts from
committee hearings and scattered floor statements provide little illumination
and “even those lowly sources speak at best indirectly to the precise question

245. 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017), rev’g sub nom. Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900 (9th
Cir. 2016) and Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016) and
Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare Sys., 810 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2015). All three appeals court
cases reach the same result, and they invoke almost entirely the same legislative history. In
granting certiorari on all three decisions and reversing them all, the Supreme Court refers to
them collectively. Accordingly and for convenience, we do so as well, identifying legislative
history references by one or more appeals court decisions as necessary at different points.
246. The three circuit courts discussed 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2012). See Rollins v.
Dignity Health (Rollins), 830 F.3d 900, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Advocate
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care
Network (Stapleton), 817 F.3d 517, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Advocate Health Care
Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare Sys. (Kaplan),
810 F.3d 175, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Advocate Health Care Network v.
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). “Church plan” refers to plans established by religious
institutions such as synagogues and mosques, not simply churches.
247. Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 527 (citing S. REP. NO. 383 (1973)).
248. Rollins, 830 F.3d at 907–08 (citing 1980 Senate floor statements and 1980 Senate
Finance Committee executive session minutes); Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 528 (citing a 1978
House floor statement); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 184–85 (citing 1980 Senate floor statements and
1980 Senate Finance Committee executive session minutes).
249. Advocate Health Care Network, 137 S. Ct. at 1658–59.
250. Id. at 1661–62.
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here.”251 The Court’s most specific reliance on legislative record evidence
was to testimony at a 1979 Senate Finance Committee hearing, cited by the
United States in its amicus brief as undermining employees’ arguments about
the purpose of the provision; this was a hearing not mentioned by any of the
appeals court decisions.252 The Court also invoked a Senate floor statement
without mentioning that it had been addressed (and purportedly
distinguished) in some detail by two of the appeals courts.253
We regard this as inconsistent usage that is direct and strategic. The three
appeals courts relied on several pieces of legislative history to support their
shared view of what the 1980 definitional change did and did not accomplish.
Moreover, the courts were remarkably unified in the record evidence they
cited and the implications they drew from it. The Supreme Court looked
askance at that history, instead adverting briefly to a single hearing excerpt
from a year earlier. The appeals courts viewed the history as relatively
meaningful, consistent, and coherent; the Supreme Court decidedly did not,
and invoked an isolated document as support for its contrary conclusion.
These legislative history co-reliance examples make clear that the
prospects for direct inconsistency that is strategic are comparable to those for
dictionaries and canons. The Supreme Court may cite to a different piece of
legislative history while ignoring or downplaying the history relied on by the
appeals court (as in Linden Lumber and Advocate Health Care Network). In
addition, consistency in co-reliance may vary in its complexion: relatively
straightforward in certain instances (as in Espinoza) but harder to assess in
others (as in City of Jackson).
More broadly for our case-specific examples, strategic co-reliance did not
align with the ideological outcomes typically associated with these three
resources. Direct inconsistency in dictionary reliance supported both proemployer and pro-employee results (Navarro and Kasten254); similarly,
direct inconsistency for language canons favored employees in two related
cases (Burlington Northern and Gómez-Pérez), and legislative history results
favored employers when consistent (Espinoza) as well as when strategic
(Linden Lumber). On the other hand, direct inconsistency did align pretty
closely with Supreme Court reversals in our twelve illustrative cases.255
The classification of these cases in doctrinal terms involves close
judgments in several instances. And of course, they are examples, not
patterns. But they suggest that once one enters the case-specific details of
251. Id. at 1661. It is worth pointing out that the Senate Finance Committee executive
session (part of the committee markup on the bill), relied on by two of the three circuit courts,
is not the same as a traditional committee hearing.
252. Id. at 1662.
253. See 125 CONG. REC. 10,052 (1979) (statement of Sen. Talmadge); see also Advocate
Health Care Network, 137 S. Ct. at 1662 (briefly discussing the statement); Rollins, 830 F.3d
at 907–08 (discussing the statement in more detail); Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 183–84 (same).
254. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (summarizing the Kasten Court’s proemployee holding under the antiretaliation protections of ERISA).
255. All six reversals involved direct inconsistency. Of six affirmances, only one
(Burlington Northern) involved direct inconsistency; of the others, four were consistent coreliance and one (Sutton) was indirect inconsistency.
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co-reliance settings, divergence in application of the same interpretive
resource is a strikingly frequent result, just as it was as part of our empirical
findings.
IV. REVISITING THE DEBATE OVER UNIFORMITY
Our discussion in Part I addressed the normative debate on uniformity in
statutory interpretation. Although our extensive empirical findings and
illustrative doctrinal analyses are descriptive rather than normative, they have
certain normative implications that seem worthy of attention.
Insofar as proponents of a uniform approach extol the virtues of
predictability, our findings provide a modicum of support for their position.
The Supreme Court’s increasing reliance during the Rehnquist and Roberts
years on ordinary meaning, language canons, and dictionaries, and its
declining interest in legislative history, are trends that the appeals courts
followed several years later.256 These meaningful positive correlations
suggest that circuit courts are being influenced to some degree by Supreme
Court changes in emphasis and priority when invoking interpretive resources.
This may be in part because appeals court judges have become more
convinced as to the virtues of predictability. Alternatively, it may reflect a
strategic calculation by these judges that their decisions contributing to a
circuit split are more likely to be affirmed if they adhere to the Court’s
changing methodological priorities. Additionally, insofar as there has been
some channeling of interpretive discretion, circuit judges and the attorneys
who practice before them may perceive more guidance and less uncertainty
when briefing, arguing, and deciding cases. Whether the Supreme Court’s
influence involves any synergies with attorneys who reinforce that influence
through the adjustment of their own arguments is a question that deserves
separate empirical inquiry.257
On the other hand, a number of our findings lend descriptive support to
normative arguments opposing a uniform approach. One such argument
involves differences in institutional perspective. We found that appeals
courts overall rely more often on ordinary meaning and agency deference,
and less often on legislative purpose, than does the Supreme Court. We
suggest that these differences relate to case-management priorities faced by
the lower courts, in that appeals court judges prefer simpler interpretive
frameworks as more compatible with their heavier workloads.258 In
particularized terms, we found that the circuit courts rely somewhat more
often on language canons in ERISA cases. We propose that the unusually
complex wording of this statute may well trigger the lower courts’ need to
invoke these canons as an aid to deciphering ordinary meaning.259 We also
256. See supra Tables 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
257. For preliminary related inquiries into the influence of attorneys and their briefs on
Supreme Court reasoning, see, for example, Liberal Justices, supra note 2, at 164–65 and
Oasis or Mirage, supra note 2, at 532–33.
258. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
259. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
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identified a notable pro-employee tilt in the appeals courts associated with
reliance on agency deference. We view this tilt as a likely corollary to circuit
courts’ greater overall reliance on agency deference to help manage their
workloads,260 given that the agencies charged with applying these workerprotection statutes tend to be pro-worker when implementing their
congressional mission.261
Additional findings support a second argument against uniformity, based
on circuit court reaction to certain justices’ campaigns for a more textualist
orthodoxy. Despite the Supreme Court’s diminished appetite for legislative
history starting in the Scalia years, appeals courts continue to rely on
legislative record evidence accompanying these pro-worker statutes, leading
to a distinctive pro-worker tilt that is missing in Supreme Court reliance on
the resource.262 In addition, we identify a substantial decline in co-reliance
for ordinary meaning in the Rehnquist and Roberts eras, along with a large
decline in co-reliance for dictionaries in the Roberts era and for agency
deference in the Rehnquist era.263 Our inference—that circuit courts may
well be reacting silently but negatively to the doctrinaire pronouncements of
certain Supreme Court justices—lends support to the value of a pluralist
interpretive approach grounded in the well-rooted views and practices of
appeals court judges related to the selection of interpretive resources.
A third normative observation is that our findings on matches and
nonmatches, and our individual case analyses of consistencies and
inconsistencies, underscore both the inevitability and the value of
deliberative disputation.264 The fact that reliance on language canons
exhibits relatively more disagreement than legislative history reliance (in the
form of a higher level of nonmatches and a higher reversal rate) may reflect
the more open-ended and less hierarchical aspects of the canons universe.
But more broadly, our findings that the Supreme Court and appeals courts in
individual cases rely on different categories of resources, and different
specific resources within the same category, contribute to the prospects for
achieving well-reasoned and sound results. The justices may decide to
emphasize different bases for interpretation than the appeals courts did, but
in doing so they must confront what the lower courts concluded were the
260. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Table 8 and accompanying text. The steep decline in agency deference coreliance deserves more attention than we can give it here. Insofar as our findings suggest that
Chevron, as later refined (or muddled) by United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001),
failed to generate a consistent approach to agency deference cases, they are broadly consistent
with findings about the Supreme Court’s own approach to agency deference during the
Rehnquist era. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). Additionally (or alternatively), the appeals courts’ consistently higher
reliance on agency deference across all three eras, as shown in Table 4, may mask some degree
of politicization of that resource by a Rehnquist Court that was quite likely to find “stage one”
review appropriate in Chevron settings.
264. See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.
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most relevant resources, even if these do not match the justices’ own
preferences. And insofar as the justices ignore or inadequately respond to
this divergence, they are likely to be criticized—in a Court dissent, in the
scholarly community, and perhaps in Congress.
Finally, we recognize that apart from the endogenous rule-of-law
foundations for our empirical and doctrinal analyses, interpretive
convergence and divergence may be attributable in part to extrinsic factors
that also influence the judiciary. We have referred at various points to the
impact of statutory interpretation pedagogy and scholarship, the litigation
strategies adopted by government attorneys, the presidential appointment
power, and the frequency of congressional overrides and media criticism of
activist courts.265 We do not try to assess the influence of these factors here,
and we are not confident as to how that might be accomplished. Still, we
recognize that they may contribute in various ways, militating either in favor
of or against a more uniform interpretive approach.
CONCLUSION
The judicial choice of whether to rely on a particular category of resource
and the choice of a particular version of that resource are fundamentally
similar. Judges draw on the resources they deem useful—either to help them
in finding the “right answer” as a principled matter or to help them justify for
strategic reasons an answer they have already reached. Our descriptive
analysis of reliance patterns in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
does not allow us to infer either a predominantly principled or a primarily
strategic motivation in choices about which resources to rely on. What is
clear from our findings is that even when both courts rely on the same
resource category, Supreme Court decisions often involve a specific version
of that resource—and a manner of applying or analyzing it—that diverges
from the version and manner relied on by the circuit courts.
The debate about whether federal courts of appeals should conform their
choices of interpretive resources to those of the Supreme Court is lively and
likely to continue. This Article sheds important light on that debate through
our understanding of the actual practices of the two levels of courts. By
focusing on a set of identical cases on which both levels reach decisions, we
have been able to compare their practices in a particularly direct way.
In our inquiry, we found considerable similarity between the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals in their overall reliance on certain particular
resources. That similarity is not surprising in light of shared expectations
about the appropriateness of these resources in general. Further, we found
some evidence that the Supreme Court’s collective preferences about the use
of certain resources have influenced practices in the courts of appeals.
But it is the divergence between the two levels of courts that stands out.
Across the set of labor and employment cases that we analyzed, there were
some substantial differences in the frequency with which the Supreme Court
265. See supra notes 24, 101, 120, 122 and accompanying text.
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and the courts of appeals relied on various resources. Even more striking
was divergence in specific cases. When one court relied on a resource such
as legislative history or language canons, quite often the other court did not.
Further, even when both courts relied on such a resource, the specific
versions they used frequently differed. And in the illustrative cases we
reviewed in-depth, inconsistent usage of the same resource was especially
prevalent when the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court decision.
Although we identified various possible reasons for case-specific
divergences regarding our six interpretive resources, we cannot reach
definitive judgments about the relative weight of those reasons. Still, it
seems clear that a substantial degree of divergence is inevitable even in this
special universe of identical cases. Whatever its desirability may be as a
normative matter, uniformity between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals in reliance on interpretive resources is a chimera.

